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Anxieties and Postwar Legal Thought
Carl Landauer*
I. INTRODUCTION
Erwin Panofsky, the 6migr6 art historian often credited with
revolutionizing American art history, gave a Princeton
commencement address in 1953 with a title that seemed perfectly
suited to the obligatory incantations of graduation ceremonies: In
Defense of the Ivory Tower In it Panofsky distinguished the scholar
occupying the ivory tower from those engaged in social activity on
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the ground below. Nevertheless, the occupant of the ivory tower was
not entirely distanced from the social life of the community.
Ultimately, the scholar functioned for Panofsky as a sort of
"watchman": "Whenever the occupant perceives a danger to life or
liberty, he has the opportunity, even the duty, not only to 'signal
along the line from summit to summit' but also to yell, on the slim
chance of being heard, to those on the ground."3 Panofsky went on to
enumerate scholars who had sounded the alarm: Socrates, Erasmus,
Sebastian Castellio, Voltaire, Theodor Mommsen, the seven
professors at Gcttingen, and Albert Einstein. All had "raised their
voices when they felt that there was a danger to liberty."' Although
Panofsky's address was delivered at the height of the McCarthy era,
one had to read between the lines to detect a critique of his
contemporary America-he was not shouting very loudly himself.
But it is nevertheless clear that Panofsky's image of the scholar in
the ivory tower was one of general disconnectedness from political
activity, except at extreme moments in the life of the community.
I mention Panofsky-the historian of medieval and Renaissance
art and proponent of iconology-because his formulation of the
scholar in the ivory tower seems to have an interesting resonance
with Learned Hand's image of the judge. Just like Panofsky's
scholar, Hand cautioned the judge to interfere as little as possible
with the political process. Hand, the champion of judicial restraint, is
a familiar story, but Hand's mind-as is clear in a number of essays
in The Spirit of Liberty-was also occupied with the threat of
totalitarianism. He worried about the impact of mass culture, calling
the art of publicity a "black art,"5 and stated that "[w]e need not look
to Russia and Germany, or to their pathetic Italian imitator; we need
not leave home at all"6 to confront the work of mass suggestion.
Against the totalitarian threat to liberal society, Hand posited the
importance of free inquiry, which would finally be the rock upon
which totalitarian seductions would founder. In The Supreme Court
of the United States,7 Paul Freund quotes Hand to the effect that "a
society so riven that the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can
save; that a society where that spirit flourishes, no court need save."'
3. Id. at 121.
4. Id.
5. LEARNED HAND, Mr. Justice Brandeis (1942), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 161
(Irving Dilliard ed., 1952).
6. LEARNED HAND, Liberty (1941), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 5, at 144, 149.
On Hand's concerns with the domestic totalitarian threat, see Carl Landauer, Scholar,
Craftsman, & Priest: Learned Hand's Self-Imaging, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 231,255-57 (1991).
7. PAUL FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS BUSINESS,
PURPOSES, AND PERFORMANCE (1961).
8. Id. at 88 (quoting LEARNED HAND, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to
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This does not suggest an effective role for the judge in the
maintenance of a free society. And yet, as one reads Hand's various
essays, it becomes clear that Hand viewed judging as a liberal art
and, as such, part of the defense of the liberal state. Just like
Panofsky's denizens of the ivory tower, Hand's judge was not meant
to interfere with the flow of the political life. But in extreme danger,
Panofsky's scholar and Hand's judge were needed.
The extreme danger in the postwar imagination was, of course,
totalitarianism. During the war, the term was still enough of a
neologism that Max Lerner put quotation marks around it in the title
of one of his essays reproduced in Ideas for the Ice Age.' The
quotation marks would quickly disappear, and a belief in the
commonality of Hitler and Stalin's states became a centerpiece of
postwar political and historical thought. One of the great monuments
to the postwar obsession with totalitarianism is, of course, Hannah
Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, with its social and structural
analysis of totalitarian growth in modem society.'" But perhaps more
interesting as a record is the interdisciplinary conference on
totalitarianism convened by the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences in the spring of 1953, a gathering that included the likes of
Karl Deutsch, Erik Erikson, George F. Kennan, Carl Friedrich,
David Riesman, Hannah Arendt, and Harold Laswell, among others.
Despite the debates back and forth throughout the sessions-Did
Christianity provide soil for the growth of totalitarianism? What is
the importance of ideology to totalitarianism? - the conference
embodied the need to arrive at an economic, psychological, social,
and political composite portrait of the most important and
threatening of modern phenomena. In his introduction to the
conference's published papers, Carl Friedrich emphasized
totalitarianism's newness, noting that the phenomenon had "burst
upon mankind more or less unexpected and unannounced.""1 It was,
he thought, "striking, indeed, that none of the outstanding scholars
in history, law, and the social sciences discerned what was ahead.
Neither Veblen nor Durkheim, Jellinek nor Duguit, Max Weber nor
Civilization (1944), in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, supra note 5, at 172, 181 (emphasis in
original)).
9. MAx LERNER, Democratic Ends and "Totalitarian" Means, in IDEAS FOR THE ICE AGE
34 (1941). After citing a discussion of the "totalitarian state" in a 1933 article in the Christian
Century, Edward Purcell writes that the "term became common after 1935, and its increasingly
frequent use was significant. It provided a convenient term, especially after 1939, under which
to join communism, fascism, and Nazism." EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF
DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 135 (1973).
10. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (1976) (1951).
11. Carl J. Friedrich, The Problem of Totalitarianism-An Introduction,
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Pareto sensed the trend which culminated in totalitarianism.' '12
Newness and importance were coupled to suggest that
totalitarianism was tangled with the modern.
If totalitarianism was intricately bound up with the modern, its
threat was palpable, and clearly its shadow was a constant presence
in postwar social and political thought. And although I will refer to
specific threats framed in terms of Nazism or Stalinism, it is the
unified notion of a "totalitarianism" as a phenomenon of the
twentieth century that drew so much attention.3 In this Article I will
analyze anxieties about totalitarianism as one of the main thematics
of political and other social thought, as a thematic that brought
together the neo-Freudian and anthropological analysis of the
psychology of modern American culture as ultimately pathological, a
pathology posing a totalitarian threat. In the first part of my Article,
then, I will examine a number of the major figures in social and
political thought, scholars who appear again and again in footnotes
during the period following the war until roughly 1960-and most of
whom continue to do so today. Then, I will turn to legal scholars who
are familiar reference points in legal literature. By comparison, the
legal scholars, although they too might make shadowy references to
totalitarianism, are not possessed by the same anxiousness about an
anxious society.
I will argue that this difference between social and legal thought is
ultimately a difference founded in two different institutional
cultures. In the end, the legal culture I will describe was
characterized by an often internalized attachment to government,
and tended to see even its most academic law review writing as
policy writing. This legal culture views government as efficacious
rather than susceptible to the mood swings of a pathological society.
This is part of the confident strain in legal writing, as opposed to the
anxiousness of social science writing. I will argue that there is a
confident identification with government that, if often implicit, is one
of the marks of legal writing not only in the postwar period of
roughly 1945 to 1960 but also today. And I will offer an analysis of
the separateness of legal thought. If other scholars, including Morton
Horwitz, Richard Primus, Neil Duxbury, and Gary Peller, see
postwar legal writers as reacting to the threat of totalitarianism and
closely aligned in spirit with their peers in the social sciences, I would
like instead to identify a separate style in legal scholarship that not
12. Id.
13. Here Abbott Gleason's excellent study of the development of totalitarianism as an idea
provides a strong sense of my subject matter, especially in his chapters that address the
immediate postwar period. See ABBOTr GLEASON, TOTALITARIANISM: THE INNER HISTORY
OF THE COLD WAR (1995).
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only made it less concerned with totalitarianism and the pathological
culture of America during the postwar period but also continues to
characterize it today.
Largely via Edward Purcell's narrative in The Crisis of Democratic
Theory about the impact of the totalitarian threat upon legal
realism's separation of the "is" and the "ought,"1 Morton Horwitz
has identified the "varying interpretations of and reactions to the
horrors of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism" as one of the three major
influences that "shaped" postwar legal thought.'5 Horwitz tells his
readers that Americans, struck by the tragedies that befell
democracy in Europe, developed a preoccupation with the rule and
nature of democracy, and that preoccupation more than any other
defined the subject matter of postwar political and legal writing. 6
Horwitz splits these postwar writings into two vying interpretations
of the strength of democracy in the United States. The first was a
"version of consensus theory which sought to portray the existence
of a basic societal consensus on fundamental values" (here he is
thinking of the likes of Daniel Boorstin, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and
Louis Hartz), and the second, an "equilibrium theory that posited
that agreement would emerge after trading among different and
competing groups"" (here he is thinking of figures like Robert Dahl,
influenced by Joseph Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy"S). For Horwitz, the two schools coalesced around a
common belief in underlying consensus. In a sense, they represented
two different forms of consensus theory. 9
Despite Horwitz's subtlety, this allows him to move back towards
the easy critique of consensus theory first offered by John Higham's
The Cult of the "American Consensus" in 1959.20 Horwitz's move
14. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 7.
15. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOxY 247 (1992).
16. See id. at 255.
17. ld. at 251.
18. JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
19. After quoting Dahl to the effect that "[pirior to politics.., is the underlying consensus
on policy that usually exists in the society among a predominant portion of the politically
active members," HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 256 (quoting ROBERT DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY 132-33 (1956)), Horwitz goes on to state:
Here we see the close relationship between interest group pluralist theories of politics
modeled on equilibrium theories in economics and consensus theories that sought to find
fundamental agreement over ends and values. Whether rooted in a picture of a relatively
conflict-free American history or of a non-ideological "American mind," consensus
theories buttressed the view either that there could be agreement on rules of the game
independently of ends or else that all politics involved simply the non-ideological
question of the most efficacious means for arriving at undisputed ends.
Id. at 257.
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suggests questions about the degree to which an emphasis on
consensus helps us to understand the response to totalitarianism in
American postwar social and political thought, as well as
developments in postwar legal thought. But I would rather focus
attention on the expression of anxiety about totalitarianism in social
and political thought and the extent to which that expression is
mirrored in postwar legal thought.
To support my claim that the social and political science writing of
the postwar period was fraught with worry about totalitarianism and
its organic relationship to modern society, I will argue that postwar
political and other social scientists turned to a blend of neo-
Freudianism and anthropology to help produce a psychopathology of
modern culture, and quite explicitly modem American culture. Their
shared analysis suggests a neurotic society that could easily make the
totalitarian turn: Mass society was a step away from totalitarian
society. Significantly, this threat was viewed alternatively as an
oligarchic threat coming from above, or as a mob threat coming from
below, and it was framed as a threat coming principally from the left
or as a threat coming principally from the right.2 But the anxiety in
social and political science writing was palpable and very much
center-stage. In contrast to the centrality of totalitarian anxieties in
the social and political science writing, I have not found such deep-
seated worries preoccupying postwar legal writers.
Various legal scholars, including Morton Horwitz,22  Laura
Kalman,23 and Gary Peller," have drawn from Edward Purcell's
argument in The Crisis of Democratic Theory that Nazism created a
crisis for the scientistic is/ought separation of legal realism, and they
have seen this crisis as formative for the development of legal
thought in the 1950s. Richard Primus has provided an extended
analysis of the impact of totalitarianism on postwar constitutional
thought and has carefully followed its path in the turn to human
rights, a renewed interest in morality and its "counterpoint," and a
growth of an anti-ideological skepticism.' What is interesting is that
21. My suggestion of top-down and bottom-up threats seen as coming from the left or the
right is roughly modeled after Richard Parker's fourfold grid: He posits a liberal and
republican split in constitutional rhetoric that is again split into a conservative and populist
republicanism and a liberalism divided between a focus on transcendental forms of polity and
pluralism. In his book, "Here, the People Rule": A Constitutional Populist Manifesto, Parker
focuses on the populist/conservative rhetorical divide, but that divide is only half of the larger
structure that is part of his constitutional analysis and that he has used to frame his
constitutional law teaching. See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE": A
CONSTITUTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994).
22. See HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 247.
23. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 41 (1996).
24. See Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
25. See Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence: Totalitarianism in Postwar
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many of these responses to the totalitarian example are not
accompanied by the psychopathology that characterizes the culture
of the social and political sciences as well as their fearful expression.
Rather, many of the postwar jurisprudential developments, such as
the turn to process or to neutrality, may have grappled with
totalitarianism as a problem that had to be addressed by legal
thought-the old legal realism just wouldn't do-but they did not
grapple with totalitarianism as a dire threat to American society.
There were, of course, legal writers who expressed fear of
totalitarianism, particularly Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson,
and those fears were unquestionably a part of postwar civil liberties
jurisprudence. But, overall, the worries expressed elsewhere were
left mostly unexpressed in legal thought.
We have, of course, learned to see presence in absence. To explain
absence as presence, one may turn, for example, to Anna Freud's
analysis of "denial" as one of the key defense mechanisms of the ego,
to the Derridean interest in absence as presence, and even to the
most mundane observation that the unstated may often be too
obvious to state explicitly. I will argue, however, that the real source
of this difference between social and legal thought stems from the
institutional culture of postwar legal thinking. In part, it derives from
paired worldly and otherworldly detachments from the anxiety of
totalitarianism. The worldliness often results from simple
biography-the "New Deal lawyers" described in Peter Irons's book
of that title26 filled the postwar bench and law school faculty, and
they brought with them in their transition from governance an
attachment to the positive role of government and the importance of
the administrative state. Coupled with this worldly experience was
the otherworldly culture of the bench and the law school that legal
realism seemed unable finally to overcome-or rather into which
legal realism transmogrified.27 This priestly posture28 signified an
inward look at the judiciary and its values. If Lon Fuller worried
about early twentieth-century German legal scholarship contributing
to the rise of the Nazis,29 his argument only underscores the
Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996).
26. PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982).
27. See Peller, supra note 24.
28. At the end of my article on Learned Hand, I suggest that the resonance of his
deployment of self-images of scholar, craftsman, and priest had much to do with his reputation.
See Landauer, supra note 6, at 262.
29. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REv. 630 (1958). Richard Primus writes that "Hart and Fuller both took as their
point of departure the question of how legal systems should deal with the problem of Nazism."
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characteristic self-absorption of legal writing? All of the social
upheaval and psychological dislocations that are so central to social
and political science writing were ultimately missing from the legal
writing of the postwar period.
In my conclusion to this Article, I will turn to Laura Kalman's The
Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, and to her depiction of legal
liberals' faith in the courts' ability to improve society. Kalman's
story-this is the "strangeness" of the career-traces an oscillation in
which legal liberalism falls victim to law and economics and critical
legal studies, reemerges in the turn to history and the enchantment
with republicanism, and finally seems to disappear with the growth
of a more truly interdisciplinary postmodernism. I suggest that if we
broaden Kalman's vision of legal liberalism beyond an engagement
with the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to a more general
belief in the country's political institutions- or at least a faith in their
reformability-we may find that the core values of legal scholarship
are not quite as subject to the various reversals described by Kalman.
Duncan Kennedy's book, A Critique of Adjudication (fin de
siecle),31 provides an example of how mired even critical legal studies
has been in the traditional values of our legal culture. There
Kennedy-from the perspective of what he describes as a left
"modernism/postmodernism" 
- makes an explicitly internal critique
of adjudication. As he explains, he is attacking adjudication from
within, and since the attack is from within, he demonstrates a very
traditional legal academic attachment to adjudication. In discussing
the place of ideology as well as doctrine in judicial decision making,
Kennedy writes of the importance of "intelligentsias" to the
development of ideologies-and clearly for Kennedy, the law
professor has a role in the policy production of the intelligentsia. In
an important sense, Kennedy is making explicit the core argument of
this Article: If the postwar legal academy felt close to the political
institutions of the country, it continues to do so by believing in its
own involvement in the nation's policy production. Kennedy knows
that he is no longer an enfant, but it turns out he may never have
been that terrible.
Ultimately, the self-proclaimed heirs of the New Deal are not
alone. When the Yale Law Journal published a two-issue symposium
entitled The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilities in
the Administrative State32 in 1983, it came as no surprise that Bruce
30. Of course, legal writers may not be entirely alone. The philosopher Ernst Cassirer in
his Myth of the State sees philosophical determinism as the key to National Socialism. See
generally ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (1946).
31. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SItCLE) (1997).
32. Symposium: The Legacy of the New Deal: Problems and Possibilities in the
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Ackerman's Foreword spoke fondly of "activist lawyering."33 But if
Ackerman so clearly identifies with an active role in the regulatory
state, Duncan Kennedy, even in "critique," exhibits the same
confidence in the policy role of the legal academic. I will end this
Article by using Kennedy as an example of the underlying belief in
the legal academic community that the law school is one of the
country's political institutions, confirming Robert Post's observation
that legal academics are "apt to confuse [their] truth with power. '
Thus, if I have suggested that postwar legal writers exhibited less
fear of the emergence of a totalitarian state than their peers
elsewhere in the university, it is because of their more positive view
of the country's political institutions and ultimately because of their
confidence that the law school numbered among those institutions.
II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE
INFLUENCE OF ANXIETY
In this part, I will turn to a range of social and political science
writers who created the academic lingua franca of the postwar period
and have remained reference points today, if often as foils for post-
1950s thinking. In the postwar period they were constant reference
points for each other and for other scholars. But, as I will suggest,
their own endnotes are filled with a confluence of neo-Freudians and
the generation of cultural anthropologists trained at Columbia by
Franz Boaz. For them, modem society in the United States was
pathological, and its myth-laden irrationalism raised the threat of a
totalitarian society. In this anxious mood, many social and political
scientists turned to Tocqueville and Madison as means of dealing
with the tyranny of opinion in the new mass culture-hence the
postwar revivals of both Tocqueville and Madison. But those revivals
are only defensive symbols of a significant anxious strain in social
thought. Totalitarianism was not only a Cold War threat posed from
abroad; it was also a threat posed from within.
A. Was the Vital Centered?
In the historiography of the postwar period, liberalism and
conservatism are inextricably intertwined-what else could the "vital
center" mean? So, for example, Richard Pells called his book on the
intellectuals of the 1940s and 1950s The Liberal Mind in a
Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083 (1983).
33. Bruce A. Ackerman, Foreword: Law in an Activist State, 92 YALE L.J. 1083, 1088-94
(1983).
34. Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship, 11
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Conservative Age,35 and Marian Morton subtitled her book on
Arthur Schlesinger, Louis Hartz, Daniel Boorstin, Edmund Morgan,
and Richard Hofstadter, Liberal Historians in a Conservative Mood.36
Indeed, Pells observed, consensus theory seemed to blend
imperceptibly into the ideas of "those in the burgeoning American
Studies movement who undertook an interdisciplinary quest for the
national 'character'."37  The American exceptionalism of the
emerging American Studies field, the exceptionalism of R.W.B.
Lewis's The American Adam,38 Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land,39
and Perry Miller's two-volume The New England Mind,' shared
family traits with the American exceptionalism of the so-called
consensus historians and like-minded sociologists."
Although these observations have a fair degree of truth, the
interesting part of the story is less the tale of consensus theory as
complacence than that of consensus theory as anxiety. Although
Pells writes that "Hartz and Hofstadter were neither pleased with
nor complacent about the values they perceived as dominant in
American life,"42 he ultimately identifies them as exceptions who
maintained "their intellectual independence at a time when many
writers - scorning affiliations with a movement or class - had become
partisans of and propagandists for the nation as a whole."43 I would
like to suggest, however, that Hartz and Hofstadter were hardly
alone. If Daniel Boorstin's The Genius of American Politics" was as
35. RICHARD H. PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE: AMERICAN
INTELLECTUALS IN THE 1940s AND 1950s (1985).
36. MARIAN J. MORTON, THE TERRORS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLITICS: LIBERAL
HISTORIANS IN A CONSERVATIVE MOOD (1972). Although I suggest certain common traits in
the thought of a very broad range of social and political scientists, I do not subscribe to some of
the commonplaces of identifying a "consensus history." In my view, not only is Boorstin's
devotion to the consensus he identified quite distant from the critical tenor of Louis Hartz's
Lockean America, but, as I will argue, the critical and the anxious were generally much more
significant aspects of the narratives usually described as "consensus history" than often
suggested. See DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1953); LOuis
HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 306, 308 (Harcourt Brace 1991) (1955).
37. PELLS, supra note 35, at 149.
38. R.W.B. LEWIS, THE AMERICAN ADAM: INNOCENCE, TRAGEDY, AND TRADITION IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1955).
39. HENRY NASH SMITH, VIRGIN LAND: THE AMERICAN WEST AS SYMBOL AND MYTH
(1950).
40. PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1954);
PERRY MILLER, THE NEW ENGLAND MIND: FROM COLONY TO PROVINCE (1953).
41. See PELLS, supra note 35, at 149-50.
42. Id. at 162. Peter Novick makes a similar point about the critical edge to Hofstadter and
Hartz. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE "OBJECTIVITY QUESTION" AND THE
AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 334 (1988).
43. PELLS, supra note 35, at 162.
44. BOORSTIN, supra note 36. In this context it is, however, important to remember
Boorstin's expressions of embattlement against communism domestically in his testimony
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities in 1953. As quoted by Peter Novick,
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celebratory as its title, other social and political thinkers of the
postwar period-even those commonly consigned to the consensus
school-were driven by fear, and that fear represented a vital part of
their intellectual energy.
Arthur Schlesinger, despite his present association with
''complacence," was quite serious about the title of his chapter
"Politics in an Age of Anxiety" in The Vital Center."5 We may feel
assured, he tells us, that the "United States still has buffers between
itself and the anxieties of our age: buffers of time, distance, of
natural wealth, of national ingenuity, of a stubborn tradition of
hope."46 Indeed, the "world tragedy still has the flickering unreality
of a motion picture," holding our attention only when it is in sight,
"but, lingering over the familiar milkshake in the bright drugstore,
we forget the nightmare in the resurgence of warmth and comfort."'47
Yet, for Schlesinger, the nightmare is undeniable. If The Vital Center
is known for engaging unabashedly in Cold War apologetics, the
"anxiety" of Schlesinger's chapter title refers in large part to the
endemic anxieties of modern society.'
With multiple references to Schumpeter's Capitalism, Socialism
and Democracy, Schlesinger explains that the flip side of the
"liberation of energy under capitalism" is debilitation. 9
"Organization," he explained, "impersonalizes all it touches; and,
with the loss of personality, ownership loses its ability to command
vital loyalties."5 Schlesinger turns in his next chapter to Erich
Fromm's Escape from Freedom with its argument that the freedoms
of modern society are anxiety-producing, triggering, in those
disposed to it, a rush to the relative comforts of a totalitarian state.5 '
Drawing from Fromm, Schlesinger came to assert that
Boorstin spoke of his religious activities because he thought "religion is a bulwark against
Communism" and of his teaching and his writing as representing another "form of [his]
opposition." THIRTY YEARS OF TREASON: ExCERPTS FROM HEARINGS BEFORE THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1938-1968, at 601-12 (Eric Bentley ed., 1971),
quoted in NOVICK, supra note 42, at 328.
45. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 1
(Da Capo Press 1988) (1949).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Schlesinger explains:
Industrialism, at the same time that it released vast new energies, imposed on the world a
sinister new structure of relationships. The result was to give potent weapons to the pride
and the greed of man, the sadism and the masochism, the ecstasy in power and the
ecstasy in submission; and it thereby increased man's sense of guilt. The result was to
create problems of organization to which man has not risen and which threaten to engulf
him; and it thereby multiplied man's anxieties.
Id. at 5-6.
49. Id. at 26 (citing SCHUMPETER, supra note 18).
50. Id.
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totalitarianism "has risen in specific response to this fear of
freedom."52
This was, of course, all standard fare. That, in fact, is one of the
things that makes The Vital Center so interesting. It is a ragout of
references that one sees over and over again in the social thought of
the 1950s. In fact, by the end of his slim volume, Schlesinger has
touched almost all the right bases -Charles Beard and Harold Laski,
Robert Michels and Karl Mannheim, Hannah Arendt and Reinhold
Niebuhr, Vernon Parrington and Adolf Berle, Alexis de Tocqueville
and E.H. Carr, Jean Paul Sartre and Albert Camus. The Vital Center
is emblematic of a striking concentration of sources in much of social
and political science writing of the 1950s. Endnotes of different
scholars often seem interchangeable, whether in the casual use of
Charles Beard as a foil or the heavy references to the work of the
neo-Freudians. And that interchangeability in turn is an indication of
thematic commonality, the elements perhaps rearranged like pieces
of a kaleidoscope but in clearly recognizable patterns nonetheless.
B. The Neurotic Time of Our Personality
The basic presupposition of so much of postwar social and political
writing-like much of the social science writing that had gone before
it-was the dislocation and dysfunctionality engendered by modern
industrial society. All of the past critiques, whether from the left or
right, from Veblen or Durkheim, were replayed, except that many of
the social pathologists of the postwar period focused increasingly on
the psychological responses to modern society as pathological. It is in
this context that the neo-Freudians with their historically
contextualized psychopathology play such an important role. Karen
Horney's The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,53 the Frankfurt
School-dominated, team-written The Authoritarian Personality,' as
well as Fromm's Escape from Freedom, are common reference
points. Similarly, Robert Nisbet tells us early on in The Quest for
Community what he learned from Karen Homey, Erich Fromm, and
Harry Stack Sullivan,55 showing his interest not in Freud's universal
52. Id. at 53.
53. KAREN HORNEY, THE NEUROTIC PERSONALITY OF OUR TIME (1937).
54. T.W. ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950).
55. Nisbet writes:
From the writings of such psychiatrists as Karen Homey, Erich Fromm, and the late
Harry Stack Sullivan we learn that in our culture, with its cherished values of individual
self-reliance and self-sufficiency, surrounded by relationships which become ever more
impersonal and by authorities which become ever more remote, there is a rising
tendency, even among the "normal" elements of the population, toward increased
feelings of aloneness and insecurity.
ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 17-18 (Oxford Univ. Press 1971) (1953).
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diagnoses but quite specifically in the "typical neuroses of
contemporary middle-class society," 6 that is, in a culturally specific
diagnosis of his era.
In The Lonely Crowd'7 David Riesman similarly draws heavily
upon Erich Fromm and Erik Erikson for a developmental study of
the "social character" of modern America." After identifying the
aim of his book as investigating an evolution in social character from
the nineteenth to the twentieth century, 9 Riesman maintains that
social character will be
familiar under one name or another to any of my readers who
are acquainted with the writings of Erich Fromm, Abram
Kardiner, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Geoffrey Gorer,
Karen Homey, and many others who have written about social
character in general, or the social character of different people
and different times.'
Here neo-Freudians and cultural anthropologists appear in an
undifferentiated list. If the neo-Freudians were interesting because
they offered a culturally contextualized Freud61-Freudianism as
cultural anthropology-why not turn directly to the cultural
anthropologists?
It is rather striking to see how often Karen Homey and Margaret
Mead appear alongside each other in texts and footnotes. 2 Homey
and Mead appear in close succession in Max Lerner's America as a
Civilization63 just as they are listed together in the second endnote of
Willard Hurst's Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the
Nineteenth-Century United States.' In framing his chapter on "The
56. Id. at 18.
57. DAVID RIESMAN ET AL., THE LONELY CROWD: A STUDY OF THE CHANGING
AMERICAN CHARACTER (Doubleday 1953) (1950).
58. In his discussion of The Lonely Crowd, Richard Pells notes that Riesman had trained
with Fromm, and he mentions the importance of the neo-Freudians and the "emphasis among
anthropologists like Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Clyde Kluckhohn on the relationship
between culture and personality." PELLS, supra note 35, at 238.
59. Riesman spoke of the "the way in which one kind of social character, which dominated
America in the nineteenth century, is gradually being replaced by a social character of quite a
different sort." RIESMAN ET AL., supra note 57, at 17.
60. Id. at 18.
61. In part this was accomplished by psychologizing Marx, so it is interesting in this context
that the first translation published in the United States of Marx's early Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts-perhaps representing the most psychological Marx-was
accompanied by an afterword by Erich Fromm. See MARX'S CONCEPT OF MAN (Erich Fromm
ed. & T.B. Bottmore trans., 1961).
62- See, e.g., DAVID M. PoTrER, PEOPLE OF PLENTY: ECONOMIC ABUNDANCE AND THE
AMERICAN CHARACTER 32-72 (1954).
63. MAx LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION: LIFE AND THOUGHT IN THE UNITED
STATES TODAY 632 (1957).
64. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
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Behavioral Scientists and National Character" in People of Plenty,
David Potter was compelled to turn to Benedict, Kluckhohn, and
Mead together with Fromm, Horney, and Adorno.65 And as Potter
works through their contributions to the study of national character
and refers to the "analyses of Mead, Riesman, and Horney, '
disciplinary boundaries become invisible.67
The search for national character, as in Lerner's chapter on
"National Character and the Civilization Process," was closely tied
to the interdisciplinary project of American Studies, to works like
Henry Nash Smith's The Virgin Land, Perry Miller's Errand into the
Wilderness,' and Marvin Meyer's The Jacksonian Persuasion.69 And
as suggested by the subtitle of Marvin Meyer's book-Politics and
Belief-the study of national character was largely the study of
national mythology at a time when the "myth and symbol" school
was thriving in literary criticism. In fact, R.W.B. Lewis's The
American Adam is at once exemplary of the American Studies
movement and of myth and symbol criticism. If Lewis instructed the
intellectual historian to "look for the images and the 'story' that
animate the ideas and are their imaginative and usually more
compelling equivalent,""0 he seemed to be following Richard Chase's
admonition not to see myth as a body of dogma or a world-view but
rather to understand that "myth is a story, myth is narrative or poetic
literature."71 And yet, a world-view was exactly what the developing
American Studies movement was after.72
Nevertheless, identifying cultures as suffused with a guiding
65. See POTTER, supra note 62, at 32-72.
66. Id. at 67.
67. Similarly, Lerner strings together the names of Mead, Riesman, and Kluckhohn along
with a series of other names, including Potter, Boorstin, and Hartz. In an interesting
formulation, Lerner writes: "For the new approach to national character by anthropologists
and psychiatrists, see as an example Ruth Benedict's on Japan, The Chrysanthemum and the
Sword." LERNER, supra note 63, at 958-59.
68. PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS (1956).
69. MARVIN MEYERS, THE JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF (1957). On
the "interdisciplinary quest for the national 'culture"' represented by the American Studies
movement, see PELLS, supra note 35, at 149-50.
70. LEWIS, supra note 38, at 3.
71. Richard Chase, Notes on the Study of Myth, 13 PARTISAN REV. 338, 339 (1946),
reprinted in JOHN B. VICKERY, MYTH AND LITERATURE: CONTEMPORARY THEORY AND
PRACTICE 67, 68 (1966). Frank Lentricchia describes Richard Chase's QUEST FOR MYTH
(1949) as one of the central influences on the myth and symbol school, along with Ernst
Cassirer's ESSAY ON MAN (1944) and Susanne Langer's PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY (1941).
See FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM 4 (1980).
72. There is, of course, a close connection between the postwar development of American
Studies and the Cold War. See, e.g., Michael Holzman, The Ideological Origins of American
Studies at Yale, 40 AM. STUD. 71 (1999). Peter Novick also points out the ties between
American Studies programs and the Cold War. See NOVICK, supra note 42, at 381. Despite the
Cold War defense of American culture embedded in the American Studies movement, the
culture it described was also fraught with anxiety.
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mythology was not limited to American Studies practitioners. For
example, political scientist R.M. MacIver opens his chapter on "The
Myth of Authority" with an assertion of the mythic ground of all
social relations. 3 Furthermore, he believed that the "central myth in
the maintenance of any social system is the myth of authority"74 and
that the "sanctification of authority" results from the "accredited
body of myths, and through the elaboration of the institutional
structure."75 MacIver, in his discussion of myth, turns to some of the
most prominent anthropologists of the century-Bronislav
Malinowski, Mead, Radcliffe-Brown, and even W.G.R. Rivers. But if
MacIver appears to universalize -and consequently neutralize-
myth, he is quite clear about the destructive mysticism of the Nazi
myth-making, such as that of Alfred Rosenberg's Myth of the
Twentieth Century.76 Totalitarian myth casts its own shadow.
If not all social theorists of the postwar period focused as sharply
on the connection between myth and Nazism as Ernst Cassirer did in
The Myth of the State,77 one can locate a recurring motif in American
social thought of the wrong-headedness and, ultimately, the
destructiveness of political mythology. Richard Hofstadter's The
American Political Tradition," for instance, stands as Hofstadter's
own latter-day rendition of Lytton Strachey's Eminent Victorians,79
similarly pointing to the hypocrisy and falsehoods underlying some
of the proudest careers in American political culture. To that effect,
Hofstadter entitled a chapter "Abraham Lincoln and the Self-Made
Myth."' And the chapter titles of Hofstadter's Age of Reform"1
include "The Folklore of Populism" 2 and "The Agrarian Myth and
Commercial Realities." 3 Indeed, Hofstadter provides an example of
a larger tendency in the social science literature toward examination
of American ideology and mythology, each seemingly fraught with
73. "We have pointed out that all social relations-the whole texture and the very being of
society-are myth-sustained, and that all changes of the social structure are mothered and
nurtured by appropriate new myths." R.M. MACIVER, THE WEB OF GOVERNMENT 39 (1947).
74. Id. at 42.
75. Id. at 43. Similarly, in the opening pages of his book, MacIver maintains that "[e]very
society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought-forms that
determines and sustains all its activities." Id. at 4.
76. See id. at 253 (citing ALFRED ROSENBERG, DER MYTHUS DES 20. JAHRHUNDERTS:
EINE WERTUNG DES SEELISCH-GEISTIGEN GESTALTENKAMPFE UNSERER ZEIT (1934)).
77. CASSIRER, supra note 30.
78. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION, AND THE MEN
WHO MADE IT (Vintage Books 1989) (1948).
79. LYTTON STRACHEY, EMINENT VICTORIANS: CARDINAL MANNING, FLORENCE
NIGHTINGALE, DR. ARNOLD, GENERAL GORDON (1918).
80. Id. at 119-73.
81. RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955).
82. Id. at 60-93.




Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 12:171
anxiety and ambivalence. Thus, for example, Perry Miller refers to
the "anxiety and torment that inform productions of the late
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,"' Meyers describes the
"Jacksonian ambivalence toward the rising economic order,"' and
Hofstadter speaks of the "deep-lying vein of anxiety" embedded in
the apparent optimism of Populist thought.' Similarly, Louis Hartz,
at the end of his Liberal Tradition in America, talks of "our own
antiradical fetishism" and "irrational Lockianism."'  Clearly,
American ideologies were psychologically driven and consequently
psychologically troubled.
Social dislocation and cognitive dissonance populate the social and
political science literature of the postwar period. As I have been
suggesting, if these pathologies were viewed as the symptoms of
social development, they were also considered the root causes of
totalitarianism or some kindred dysfunctionality. If social dislocation
or cognitive dissonance produced an irrational ideology that became
an index of totalitarianism, totalitarianism in turn deployed its own
machinery for inculcating that ideology. In that vein, Hannah Arendt
devoted a section of The Origins of Totalitarianism to propaganda.
"Totalitarian propaganda," Arendt tells us, "perfects the techniques
of mass propaganda, but it neither invents them nor originates their
themes."' Indeed, a good deal of scholarly attention was paid to the
propaganda campaigns of World War I, such as Harold Laswell's
Propaganda Technique in the World War from 1927.' 9 But over and
over again, one hears that totalitarianism has perfected the modern
techniques of propaganda. Thus, for example, Robert Nisbet writes
about totalitarianism's "approach based upon the arts of
psychological manipulation -cajolery, flattery, bribery, mass
identification with new images, and all the modem techniques of
indoctrination."' Irrationality brought us to the doorstep of
totalitarianism, with its psychological manipulations. And there was
little question that the totalitarian threat resembled the mind
controls of our commercial culture: The mind control of the
totalitarian state was closely akin to that of Vance Packard's "hidden
persuaders."91
84. MILLER, supra note 68, at 15.
85. MEYERS, supra note 69, at 254.
86. HOFSTADTER, supra note 81, at 66.
87. HARTZ, supra note 36, at 306, 308.
88. ARENDT, supra note 10, at 351.
89. HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR (1927).
90. NISBET, supra note 55, at 194.
91. See VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957). In this context it is
interesting that Abbott Gleason writes on how the brainwashing of American prisoners of war
during the Korean War was tied to the more general "enslavement of the helpless individual
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C. Mass Culture and the Cultivation of Tocqueville and Madison
There was, it seems, no lack of sophistication on the part of
Hitler's or Stalin's propagandists. But for Theodor Adorno, Max
Horkheimer, and other members of the Frankfurt School, that
sophistication was little more than the sophistication of modern
industrial society. Hollywood and Nazi Germany worked on the
same basic principles.' Adorno and Horkheimer were particularly
central figures in the burgeoning analysis of mass culture, which,
although stretching back before the war to analyses of "public
opinion" and the impact of radio and advertising, really took hold in
the 1950s. "Mass culture" and "mass society" seem everywhere-the
very thickness of Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White's
1957 anthology Mass Culture, with its forty-nine essays from
Siegfried Kracauer, Mashall McLuhan, Dwight Macdonald, Clement
Greenberg, Paul Lazarsfeld, and Robert K. Merton, among others, is
testimony to the expansiveness of the intellectual cottage industry
consumed by the culture industry.93 To these writers, mass society
was making its presence felt everywhere-even in small-town
America, as we learn about the dysfunctional defensive reactions of
the small town to the emergence of mass culture in Arthur Vidich
and Joseph Bensman's sociological study, Small Town in Mass
Society.'
Mass culture was mostly viewed as pathological,95 and there were
seemingly few voices resembling Daniel Lerner's attempt to say that
mass culture is not as brutish as all that in his essay Comfort and Fun:
psyche" that was brought into American consciousness by David Riesman's LONELY CROWD
(1950) and Vance Packard's THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957). GLEASON, supra note 13, at
103. In his book about America's postwar paranoia, Timothy Melley also turns to Riesman and
Packard, naming them in the same sentence in his preface. See TIMOTHY MELLEY, EMPIRE OF
CONSPIRACY: THE CULTURE OF PARANOIA IN POSTWAR AMERICA at vii (2000).
92. See, e.g., MAX HORKHEIMER & THEODOR W. ADORNO, The Culture Industry:
Enlightenment as Mass Deception, in DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT 120 (John Cumming
trans., Seabury Press 1972) (1944).
93. MASS CULTURE: THE POPULAR ARTS N AMERICA (Bernard Rosenberg & David
Manning White eds., 1964) (1957) [hereinafter MASS CULTURE].
94. ARTHUR J. VIDICH & JOSEPH BENSMAN, SMALL TOWN IN MASS SOCIETY: CLASS,
POWER AND RELIGION IN A RURAL COMMUNITY (1958).
95. It is interesting to compare the pathology derived from neo-Freudianism to the
political psychological work of Harold Laswell in his 1934 volume on World Politics and
Personal Insecurity. In the final paragraph of Part III of his book, Laswell writes:
In these trying times to speak of political psychiatry does not imply the treatment of
individual cases by psycho-therapy, however rewarding this would be in many instances.
The main application of psychiatric method to politics is in devising expedients of mass
management by means of significant symbols which induce the harmless discharge of
collective insecurities, or abolish some of the recurring sources of stress in the patterns of
institutional life.
HAROLD D. LASWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 233 (1934), reprinted in
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Morality in a Nice Society.' And part of the pathology Lerner and
others saw was the demonstrable link between mass society and
totalitarianism. Horkheimer and Adorno explain, for example, that
"[i]n America [the radio] collects no fees from the public, and so has
acquired the illusory form of disinterested, unbiased authority which
suits Fascism admirably."' For them, modern jazz is a way station to
fascism, and the modern bourgeois individual in mass society is
"already virtually a Nazi."98 C. Wright Mills would explain to us in
The Power Elite that "[flrom almost any angle of vision that we
might assume, when we look upon the public, we realize that we
have moved a considerable distance along the road to the mass
society."" He warned: "At the end of that road there is
totalitarianism, as in Nazi Germany or in Communist Russia."1" In a
similar vein, Bernard Rosenberg wrote in his introduction to Mass
Culture that "mass culture threatens not merely to cretinize our
taste, but to brutalize our senses while paving the way to
totalitarianism."101
A significant division among the psychopathologists of mass
society was a divide over whether the diagnosis discloses a "power
elite" manipulating mass society or a pathology initiated by the
masses themselves."° Those focusing on the "power elite" analyze
the manipulation practiced by that elite. "Manipulation," Mills tells
us, "becomes a problem wherever men have power that is
concentrated and willful but do not have authority, or when, for any
reason, they do not wish to use their power openly. Then the
powerful seek to rule without showing their powerfulness."'' 3
Similarly, Horkheimer and Adorno in their analysis of the "culture
industry" would talk of the "culture monopolies" and explain that
they in turn "are weak and dependent" by comparison to the "real
96. Daniel Lerner, Comfort & Fun: Morality in a Nice Society, 27 AM. SCHOLAR 153
(1958). In a similar vein, David Manning White urged that "[tihere has been such a rehearsal
of all that is ugly and bathetic in our popular arts by critics whose sincerity cannot be
questioned that it is time that the other side of the coin be examined." David Manning White,
Mass Culture in America: Another Point of View, in MASS CULTURE, supra note 93, at 13,21.
97. HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 92, at 159.
98. Id. at 155.
99. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 304 (Oxford Univ. Press 1959) (1956).
100. Id.
101. Bernard Rosenberg, Mass Culture in America, in MASS CULTURE, supra note 93, at 3,
9.
102. Wilfred McClay similarly sees postwar analysis of mass society stretching from right
to left, and when turning to the left he writes: "Intellectuals on the Left now saw in the specter
of mass society a dangerous social potential for unparalleled forms of domination, as Hitler
had just made vivid by his success in imposing his authority upon the German populace."
WILFRED M. MCCLAY, THE MASTERLESS: SELF AND SOCIETY IN MODERN AMERICA 219
(1994).
103. MILS, supra note 99, at 317.
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holders of power," the more powerful sectors of industry."° And
Dwight Macdonald observes flatly: "Mass Culture is imposed from
above." 5
One of the long-term voices announcing the threat of mass society
was, of course, Walter Lippmann. In The Public Philosophy,
Lippmann asserted: "Where mass opinion dominates the
government, there is a morbid derangement of the true functions of
power."'" And he used all of the words that suggest lack of control
and the loss of equipoise: "derangement," "passion," "intoxication,"
and "hatred. ' '1" Richard Parker has recently provided a broad
critique of this sort of anti-populist focus on the danger of the crowd
in "Here, the People Rule."l"" In part, Parker's critique is a
continuation of a suggestion in Mills's The Power Elite that,
following the conservative focus on the crowd in the French
Revolution, liberals and socialists have come to hold similar
beliefs."° Taken together, Mills tells us, "[flrom Le Bon to Emil
Lederer and Ortega y Gasset, they have held that the influence of
the mass is unfortunately increasing."' .0
In the American context, both Populism and populism (in upper
and lower case) were cast in insidious terms, and here Hofstadter's
Age of Reform stands as the central text. Keeping Freud and the
neo-Freudians in the background, Hofstadter's book provided a
psychoanalytic analysis of American reform movements, identifying
their underlying fears and anxieties. And just as Populism grew out
of uneasiness, Hofstadter believed that the "Progressive movement
was the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of
organization."' 1 As he explained, fear and anxiety produce ugliness.
Thus, for example, "[o]ne feature of the Populist conspiracy theory
that has been generally overlooked is its frequent link with a kind of
rhetorical anti-Semitism.""' No one in 1955 could miss the link
Hofstadter was suggesting between American populism and fascism,
a suggestion that was made more explicitly in Victor Ferkiss's essay
104. HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 92, at 122.
105. Dwight Macdonald, A Theory of Mass Culture, 3 DIOGENES 1 (1953), reprinted in
MASS CULTURE, supra note 93, at 59, 60. He goes on to explain that "[t]he Lords of kitsch, in
short, exploit the cultural needs of the masses in order to make a profit and/or to maintain
their class rule-in Communist countries, only the second purpose obtains." Id.
106. WALTER LIPPMANN, THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 19 (1956).
107. See, e.g., id. at 24-25.
108. PARKER, supra note 21.
109. Mills writes: "During the twentieth century, liberal and even socialist thinkers have
followed suit, with more explicit reference to what we have called the society of masses."
MILLS, supra note 99, at 309.
110. Id.
111. HOFSTADTER, supra note 81, at 216.
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Populist Influences in American Fascism."'
Hofstadter's pyscho-sociological pathology of American popular
movements was reinforced by the collection of writings on
McCarthyism that came out of a faculty seminar at Columbia in 1954
on political behavior, The New American Right,1"' with essays by
Daniel Bell, Richard Hofstadter, David Riesman and Nathan Glazer,
Peter Viereck, Talcott Parsons, and Seymour Martin Lipset."5 The
several authors saw the "new American right" of the McCarthy era
as resulting from status anxieties, essentially as a psychological
response to social movement. Again pairing psychology and
anthropology-in this case Theodor Adorno and Margaret Mead-
Richard Hofstadter talked about the "intense status concerns of
present-day politics.""' 6 In the same volume, Daniel Bell called
McCarthyism one of the "ugly excesses" created by "status
anxieties" in America."7 In his contribution, Seymour Martin Lipset
described the impact on politics of "status anxieties" and explained
that "political movements which have successfully appealed to status
resentments have been irrational in character and have sought
scapegoats which conveniently serve to symbolize the status
threat." ' Similarly, Talcott Parsons argued that "McCarthyism is
best understood as a symptom of the strains attendant on a deep-
seated process of change in our society, rather than as a 'movement'
presenting a policy or set of values for the American people to act
on."'" 9 If Peter Viereck, the self-proclaimed conservative of the
group, voiced a reassuring observation that "America is not the
Weimar Republic,""12 the volume as a whole clearly depicted the
seriousness of America's psychic illness, and, as Lipset insisted, the
113. Victor C. Ferkiss, Populist Influences in American Fascism, 10 W. POL. Q. 350, 372-73
(1957). There were, of course, many who came to the defense of Populism, and Peter Novick
describes the split on Populism as fundamentally a divide between northeastern Jews on the
one hand, and southern and midwestern gentiles on the other. See NOVICK, supra note 42, at
339.
114. THE NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (Daniel Bell ed., 1955), republished with additional
essays as THE RADICAL RIGHT (Daniel Bell ed., 1964) [hereinafter RADICAL RIGHT]. McClay
describes The New American Right as building on dmigrd anxieties about totalitarianism and
expressing "a profound distrust and fear of the dangerous potential to be found in mass
movements." MCCLAY, supra note 102, at 259.
115. Cf. PELLS, supra note 35, at 154 (discussing Hofstadter, Bell, and Lipset's distrust of
"mass enthusiasms").
116. Richard Hofstadter, The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt, in RADICAL RIGHT, supra note
114, at 75, 86.
117. Daniel Bell, Interpretations of American Politics, in RADICAL RIGHT, supra note 114,
at 47, 73.
118. Seymour Martin Lipset, The Sources of the "Radical Right," in RADICAL RIGHT,
supra note 114, at 307, 309.
119. Talcott Parsons, Social Strains in America, in RADICAL RIGHT, supra note 114, at 209,
227.
120. Peter Viereck, The Revolt Against the Elite, in RADICAL RIGHT, supra note 114, at
161,178.
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"radical right agitation has facilitated the growth of practices which
threaten to undermine the social fabric of democratic politics.'1 2' The
connection between The New American Right and the psychological
analysis of totalitarianism in The Authoritarian Personality and
Hannah Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism was unmistakable.
Anxieties about the threat to open society in a sense represent an
earlier version of the now-tired republicanism/liberalism debate, as
Walter Lippmann described his "hope" that "both liberty and
democracy can be preserved before the one destroys the other.'
22
The worry about the damage to liberal society from too much
democracy brought about a Tocqueville revival." J. Salwyn
Schapiro, for example, published an essay entitled Alexis de
Tocqueville, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in France in 1942, in
which he focused on Tocqueville's worries about the tyranny of the
majority.24 A version of this essay reappeared in his 1949 book,
which, as its subtitle suggested, may have been principally a study of
Social Forces in England and France (1815-1870), but Schapiro's
overriding preoccupation with totalitarianism and the threat to
liberalism was unmistakably apparent in the book's presentist title,
Liberalism and the Challenge of Fascism.25 If Tocqueville was one of
Schapiro's liberal heroes, he quickly grew in significance in postwar
social and political thought. 26
Tocqueville's presence figures very prominently in postwar
American thought and is closely connected to the critique of mass
culture. In The Decline of American Liberalism, Arthur Ekirch uses
Tocqueville to articulate his critique of what he saw as the
illiberalism of Jacksonian democracy.27 It is hardly surprising that
121. Lipset, supra note 118, at 307.
122. LIPPMANN, supra note 106, at 18.
123. Pells refers to the "rediscovered insights of Alexis de Tocqueville." PELLS, supra note
35, at 149. See also, e.g., MCCLAY, supra note 102, at 235 (discussing the "extraordinary
interest in Tocqueville" in the context of his discussion of the postwar critique of
modernization).
124. J. Salwyn Schapiro, Alexis de Tocqueville, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in
France, 57 POL. SCI. Q. 545 (1942), reprinted in J. SALWYN SCHAPIRO, LIBERALISM AND THE
CHALLENGE OF FASCISM: SOCIAL FORCES IN ENGLAND AND FRANCE 290 (1949) [hereinafter
SCHAPIRO, LIBERALISM].
125. The book included three chapters on "heralds of fascism" -Napoleon, Proudhon, and
Carlyle-and posed John Stuart Mill and Tocqueville as the book's heroes. See SCHAPIRO,
LIBERALISM, supra note 124.
126. Although a number of scholars including McClay point to the appearance of the
Knopf translation of Democracy in America in 1945, see e.g., MCCLAY, supra note 102, at 235,
they forget the attention that preceded it, such as GEORGE WILSON PIERSON, TOCQUEVILLE
& BEAUMONT IN AMERICA (1938). See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA
(Henry Reeve trans., rev. by Francis Brown, corr. by Phillips Bradley, A.A. Knopf 1945)
(1835).
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the Straussian team-written history of political philosophy that
emerged in 1963 numbered Tocqueville as one of the thirty-three
major figures in the history of political thought deserving of a
chapter." Marvin Zetterbaum's essay focused on the "problem of
democracy" and Tocqueville's understanding that "[l]eft to its own
devices, democracy is actually prone to the establishment of tyranny,
whether of one over all, of the many over the few, or even of all over
all."'29 On the final page of Max Lerner's chapter on "The Culture of
Machine Living," where he discussed the tyranny of opinion, he
turned to Tocqueville.1'
There are, of course, many Tocquevilles, and one can play games
with Democracy in America, selecting one of Tocqueville's dramatic
proclamations on one page and then finding its polar opposite
expressed on another page. And there were many notions to
appropriate in Tocqueville besides his focus on the "tyranny of
opinion.'' 31 But one cannot escape the significance of Tocqueville's
democratic problematic for postwar social and political thought. For
that reason, Tocqueville became a key to analyzing totalitarianism,
so that, as Robert Nisbet asserted, "the genius of [Tocqueville's]
analysis lies in the view of totalitarianism as something not
historically 'abnormal' but as closely related to the very trends hailed
as progressive in the nineteenth century.'
32
The other figure marshaled to combat anxieties about popular
energies and the threat of totalitarianism was James Madison.
Madison also experienced a renaissance in the postwar period, and
one of Madison's attractions was that he provided a way to dilute
popular radicalism.1 33 In his source book on American government,
political scientist David Fellman introduced The Federalist No. 10,
which increasingly became one of the core documents of American
128. See Marvin Zetterbaum, Alexis de Tocqueville, 1805-1859, in HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 715 (Leo Strauss & Joseph Cropsey eds., Univ. of Chicago Press 1981) (1963).
129. Id. at 726.
130. Lerner writes:
[A]s De Tocqueville saw, a society in which there is no recognized elite group to serve as
the arbiter of morals, thought, and style is bound to be a formless one in which the
ordinary person seeks to heal his insecurity by attuning himself to the "tyranny of
opinion" -to what others do and say and what they think of him. He is ruled by imitation
and prestige rather than a sense of his own worth.
LERNER, supra note 63, at 263.
131. See, e.g., DON M. WOLFE, The Plastic Mind: Tocqueville and Horace Mann, in THE
IMAGE OF MAN IN AMERICA 44-66 (1970) (1957).
132. NISBET, supra note 55, at 191.
133. See, e.g., WILFRED E. BINKLEY, AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR NATURAL
HISTORY 17-18 (2d ed. 1947) (1943). Although Binkley himself did not express a fear of
popular radicalism due to his confidence in the "political genius of our people" and the fact
that the "Atlantic Ocean is presumed to have provided a salutary immunity," he identified
Madison as having provided an answer to popular radicalism. Id.
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political thought, by giving special presentist meaning to Madison's
formulation. "In our own day, when so many have come to believe
that faction justifies totalitarian methods," Fellman wrote,
"Madison's acute analysis has a special relevance."134 Indeed, the use
of Madison to allay anxieties about totalitarianism became quite
important in the postwar period.
Despite this Madisonian renaissance, Richard Matthews has
recently advised us not to look to Madison for David Truman and
Robert Dahl's pluralism: "If it is the pluralism of David Truman or
Robert Dahl, who argued that out of the fierce competition among
interest groups public policy (or the common good) is created, then
Madison certainly cannot be considered a pluralist."'35 "Madison," he
maintained, "never thought the common good developed out of
these struggles; rather they canceled each other out, so that
equilibrium resulted." '136 Similarly, Dahl, one of the purveyors of
1950s pluralism, hardly portrayed himself as a pure Madisonian. His
book, A Preface to Democratic Theory, was essentially a dialogue
with Madison, as much argument as celebration.'37 And here,
Horwitz is quite right: Dahl's half-Madisonian postulates did not
seem to be driven by deep political fear. Concern about the
dictatorship of the many caused little more than a mild ache: "Like a
nagging tooth, Madison's problem of majority tyranny has
persistently troubled us throughout these essays."'38 Although Dahl
referred to The Authoritarian Personality in his footnotes and made
multiple references to tyranny, the tyranny is highly theoretical. "9
Dahl's general comfort is clear: "So long as the social perquisites of
democracy are substantially intact in this country, it appears to be a
relatively efficient system for reinforcing agreement, encouraging
moderation, and maintaining social peace in a restless and
immoderate people operating a gigantic, powerful, diversified, and
incredibly complex society."'" Somehow the restlessness and
immoderation seem more rhetorical than real.
If there is a certain equipoise and confidence in Dahl's A Preface
to Democratic Theory, others were more troubled. To that effect,
Henry Kariel's The Decline of American Pluralism is the story of
declension its title suggests. He may describe an America in which a
134. READINGS IN AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 9 (David Feilman ed., Rinehart
& Co. 1949) (1947).
135. RICHARD K. MATrHEWS, IF MEN WERE ANGELS: JAMES MADISON AND THE
HEARTLESS EMPIRE OF REASON 85 (1995).
136. Id.
137. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956).
138. Id. at 124.
139. See id. at 18 n.28.
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"special genius would seem to have been at work, inspiring the
development of an intricate, complex pluralistic system, a system
developing at a leisurely pace, its growth unforced by rigid public
laws or social blueprints,''. but that comment was cast in the past
tense. For this America, Kariel believed, had undergone the
depersonalization and automation depicted by Schumpeter.12 Kariel
explains: "Whereas the thrust of technology is toward integration,
the thrust of American constitutionalism is toward disorganization,
and hence ultimately toward stalemate. On the face of it, nothing
would seem more likely than that these two seemingly opposed
forces should meet in mortal combat."'4 3 The result is that
"American constitutionalism and an advanced technology, intimately
linked, have encouraged a trend toward policy formation within a
plurality of entrenched oligarchies."'" Kariel's fears are obviously
those of the top-down variety.' 5 For him, the neo-Machiavellians
"Michels, Mosca, and Pareto remain as right as ever."'" Clearly,
oligarchy is everywhere.'47
D. Age of Anxiety
Ultimately, the core analysis of totalitarianism was a
psychopathology that identified the roots of the pathology in social
developments, often drawing from Joseph Schumpeter, so that the
analysis was finally a socio-psychopathology. Hannah Arendt's The
Origins of Totalitarianism stands as the preeminent example. But
this psychopathology ran quite broadly. Thus, for example, a section
of the 1953 American Academy of Arts and Sciences conference on
totalitarianism was devoted to the "Psychological Aspects of
141. HENRY S. KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM 10 (1961).
142. See id. at 19-20.
143. Id. at 25.
144. Id. at 68.
145. See id. at 87.
146. Id. at 241. He believes that because the government is "[s]creened off from scattered,
unorganized, and unrepresented interests and thus free to ignore them, it discriminates against
them. Established to protect the private rights of the individual, the government ends by
contributing to their erosion." Id. at 87. Here Kariel joins the postwar wave of interest in the
"neo-Machiavellians." During the war, James Burnham drew attention to them. See JAMES
BURNHAM, THE MACHIAVELLIANS: DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM (1943). In 1958, James Meisel
wrote his study of Mosca, see JAMES MEISEL, THE MYTH OF THE RULING CLASS: GAETANO
MOSCA AND THE "ELITE" (1958), and H. Stuart Hughes devoted a chapter to "The Heirs of
Machiavelli: Pareto, Mosca, and Michels" in H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND
SOCIETY: THE REORIENTATION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT, 1890-1930, at 249 (1958).
147. Even the McGraw-HiU textbook on American government, in the context of the loss
of individualism in mass society, states that "[a]nother development which is anti-
individualistic and potentially dangerous to democracy is the growth of 'pressure politics'."
CULLEN B. GOSNELLS ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 454
(1955).
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Totalitarianism."" And Princeton political scientist William
Ebenstein in his slim book Today's Isms adopted a standardized
rehearsal of the "Psychological Roots of Totalitarianism."'49 There
Ebenstein turned, as others had before him, to the Frankfurt School
team-written The Authoritarian Personality to make the
psychological observation that "[t]he very existence of an
authoritarian mass movement like fascism depends on the desire of
many persons to submit and obey.""
It became standard to understand totalitarianism in psychological
terms, drawing upon neo-Freudians in combination with
psychologically oriented anthropologists so that its force was seen as
driven by social fear and anxiety. Without doubt, references to
totalitarianism occasionally came across as little more than
obligatory gestures. Indeed, Irving Howe charged in his oft-cited
essay This Age of Conformity that the danger of Stalinism, while
significant, had been used by many liberal intellectuals as a
convenient excuse to "become partisans of bourgeois society."''
Nevertheless, anxieties associated with totalitarianism- or with the
particular social or political forces that were viewed as way stations
to totalitarianism -were often quite substantial and, as I have been
arguing, palpable in much of the political and social science writing
of the postwar period.
It is difficult to read Richard Hofstadter's urgent prose without
seeing the hint of anxiety in the student of an "age of anxiety," and
there were too many refugees from Hitler's Germany in American
intellectual life for the fear of totalitarianism to be taken lightly. "2
Anxieties about totalitarianism expressed fear of a threat from one
of two directions - a fear of popular passion and a fear of
encroaching oligarchy-and both of these threats could be viewed as
coming from either the left or the right. Thus, anxieties about
totalitarianism came in a variety of different forms. Anxiety might
have been driven more by the horrors of Hitler's Germany or
Stalin's Soviet Union-or it might have found more immediacy in
the domestic experience of McCarthyism. Yet despite these
variations, a strong current brought these streams together-the
strength of the fear of totalitarianism and psychological concerns
about modern society that so mark postwar American political and
social thought.
148. See TOTALITARIANISM, supra note 11, at 139-230.
149. WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, TODAY'S ISMS (1958).
150. Id. at 91.
151. Irving Howe, This Age of Conformity, 21 PARTISAN REv. 7, 15 (1954).
152. McClay sees the 6migr6 influence as dominant in his discussion of the analysis of
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III. LEGAL THOUGHT'S INDECENT COMPOSURE
If totalitarianism was so often a significant presence -a suggestion
of imminent danger-in postwar social and political thought, what
then of postwar legal thought? As we traverse the core subjects of
postwar legal discourse-the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the
role of the courts and judicial review, civil rights and desegregation,
the function of the legal process-we should ask whether we find the
same totalitarian anxiety that was so central to political and social
science. Morton Horwitz identifies "the varying interpretations of
and reactions to the horrors of fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism" as
representing one of three broad influences on postwar legal
thought.'53 According to Horwitz, "[t]he single dominant theme in
postwar American academic legal thought is the effort to find a
'morality of process' independent of results."" And he sees the
emphasis on legal process as continuous with the process focus of
Robert Dahl's pluralism, which Horwitz in turn perceives as part of a
general move away from politics and away from the focus on "form
instead of substance" in postwar academic thought as a whole."' I
have already suggested that despite the complacent mood of Dahl,
the urgency of postwar social and political thought was unmistakable
and the force of politics real. The scholars who participated in the
American Academy of Arts and Sciences conference on
totalitarianism were clearly not "repressing" politics. But can we say
the same for legal thinkers?
A. Totalitarian Lessons for Civil Liberties Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court could hardly have ignored the threat of
totalitarianism. As Melvin Urofsky has reminded us, "Cold War
issues dominated much of the Vinson Court's docket."'56 Thus, for
example, the Supreme Court was compelled to address the threat of
communism when it upheld the Smith Act of 1940 in the Dennis
case'57 in 1951. In Dennis, the Court worked through the clear-and-
present-danger test in light of the threat represented by the
American Communist Party. In his opinion in Dennis, Chief Justice
153. HORWTZ, supra note 15, at 247.
154. Id. at 253.
155. Id. As an example, Horwitz points to the New Criticism, but we have to remember
that the New Criticism shared the literary critical stage with a number of other methodologies,
such as the myth and symbol school with its move towards contextualization. And, for
example, the postwar period also witnessed a move within art history towards
contextualization in the ascendance of iconology.
156. MELVIN I. UROFSKY, DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER
STONE AND VINSON, 1941-1953, at 159 (1997).
157. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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Vinson describes "a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly
disciplined members subject to call when the leaders... felt the time
had come for action."'58 Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion,
goes further in describing the totalitarian threat. He explains that
"[t]otalitarian groups here and abroad perfected the technique of
creating paramilitary organizations to coerce both the public
government and its citizens."'5 9 Indeed, Jackson felt that "[u]nless we
are to hold our Government captive in a judge-made verbal trap, we
must approach the problem of a well-organized, nation-wide
conspiracy... as realistically as our predecessors faced the trivialities
that were being prosecuted until they were checked with a rule of
reason."'" There is no doubt that Jackson's words were full of
foreboding. As Urofsky has suggested, Jackson, recently returned
from his duties as American prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials,
"looked on potential dictatorial groups with far less tolerance than
he had displayed in some of his wartime opinions." 6'
In his dissent in Dennis, Justice William 0. Douglas made clear
comparisons to the Soviet regime: "The opinion of the Court does
not outlaw these texts nor condemn them to the fire, as the
Communists do literature offensive to their creed."'62 But, it seemed,
the Court did the next best thing by condemning their teaching. And
Douglas would go on to quote Vishinsky's Law of the Soviet State:
"'In our state, naturally, there is and can be no place for freedom of
speech, press, and so on for the foes of socialism."' 63 Douglas
declared, "Our concern should be that we accept no such standard
for the United States."'" The Dennis case was fraught with
totalitarian fears on all sides. We have learned that Justice Felix
Frankfurter wrote Jackson an imploring note: "Could [you] not say
what you think you ought to say in Dennis without giving
unavoidable reinforcement to the McCarthy's, the McCormick's and
the other exploiters of the irrational in the land." '65 In Dennis and the
other cases on the Cold War docket described by Urofsky, the
Supreme Court was deeply engaged in the same concerns about
158. Id. at 510.
159. Id. at 577 (Jackson, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 568-69 (Jackson, J., concurring).
161. UROFSKY, supra note 156, at 172.
162. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 583 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting ANDREY VISHINSKY, LAW OF THE
SOVIET STATE (Hugh W. Babb trans., Macmillan 1948) (1938)).
164. Id. Urofsky cites Douglas's reference to Vishinsky and this poignant line. See
UROFSKY, supra note 156, at 175.
165. Note from Justice Felix Frankfurter to Justice Robert Jackson (Mar. 20, 1953), cited in
HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM 0.
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totalitarianism that I have described in the context of postwar social
and political thought, except that the Court had to make real
decisions impacting the health of the Republic. Richard Parker has
identified the invocation of fear at the heart of constitutional
argument," and clearly totalitarian anxieties fill the rhetoric of the
Court.
Jackson, who had acted as the American prosecutor in the
Nuremberg trials,"6 7 was perhaps the Justice on the Vinson Court
who expressed the deepest fear of totalitarianism. In fact, his Godkin
lectures, which were never given but published posthumously in 1955
as The Supreme Court in the American System of Government,"6 start
by invoking "these convulsive times" and very quickly move into a
confrontation with totalitarianism. In fact, the second sentence of
Jackson's book announces his "reexamination of the premises of
American constitutional democracy, which now is confronted with
an armed doctrine claiming to be a newer and higher form of
democracy." 69 It takes a while for him to name communism
specifically. Instead, he refers to a "newer and higher form of
democracy" on the first page and the "'newer' democracy" on the
next "' as if it might be mildly embarrassing to be specific because his
subject occupied a position so stage-front in Cold War America. And
in that we-all-know-what-I-am-talking-about mode, he describes how
communism denies the "independence and neutrality" of an
independent judiciary and administers a system of law that "tolerates
no judicial checks against dictatorship.' ' 7'
Jackson draws from Dennis to describe how communism is able to
use American civil libertarian culture to its own advantage: "I find
little indication that [the forefathers] foresaw a technique by which
those liberties might be used to destroy themselves by immunizing a
movement of a minority to impose upon the country an incompatible
scheme of values which did not include political and civil liberties. 1
72
For Jackson, the threat is real because the totalitarians are so
convincing: "Communism, Nazism, and Fascism have each made
166. See Richard Parker, Constitutional "Voices," in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON "THE EVOLVING U.S. CONSTITUTION: 1787-1987," at 95,
116-25 (1989).
167. For Primus, the "themes of Nuremberg became prominent in American
jurisprudence" in part due to the impact of American jurists who participated in the trial,
including Herbert Wechsler, Francis Biddle, and Robert Jackson. See Primus, supra note 25, at
430.
168. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 1 (1955).
169. Id. at 1.
170. Id. at 1-2.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 4.
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phenomenally successful drives to capture the minds and loyalties of
numerous and aspiring peoples for this philosophy so antithetic to
our own."'73 Striking a chord that would have resonated with broader
cultural messages outside of legal writing, Jackson declared that "we
are in an age of rebellion against liberty.""'7 In fact, the editors of
Jackson's posthumous lectures point out here that Jackson had
written Camus's name in the margin alongside this note.' Jackson
brought this diagnosis home and talked about American dangers-
"all of the American trends which, rightly or wrongly, have cooled
the zeal of our own people for the principles on which our
government was founded."'76 Obviously, Jackson perceived a clear
and present danger.
Similar thoughts about the threat of totalitarianism filled the
publications that debated the Court's Cold War docket.'" As
Michael Belknap describes in his Cold War Political Justice, the trial
court for the Dennis case was barraged by picket lines.'78 Clearly, the
federal courts could not escape the political energy that infused First
Amendment questions. Similarly, academic discussion of the
freedom of speech could also hardly ignore the dangers posed by the
repression of that speech. Thus, for example, in his review of
Alexander Meiklejohn's Free Speech, Zechariah Chafee worried
about popular energies when he observed that the "country seems to
be suffering again from an epidemic of hysteria such as it underwent
during the 'Red Menace' of 1919-1920.""79 And Nathaniel Nathanson,
writing on the Dennis case in the Harvard Law Review, worried
about the force of conformity: "At times when social, business, and
political pressures all put a premium upon conformity, the right of
private, confidential discussion may be even more important to the
right of dissent than public discussion."'" Moreover, he warned that
173. Id.
174. Id. at 7.
175. See id. at 87 n.6.
176. Id. at 4.
177. See, e.g., Louis B. Boudin, "Seditious Doctrines" and the "Clear and Present Danger"
Rule, 38 VA. L. REV. 143, 315 (1952); Nathan Nathanson, The Communist Trial and the Clear-
and-Present-Danger Test, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1167 (1950), reprinted in ESSAYS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 300 (Robert G. McCloskey ed. 1962); Elliot Richardson, Freedom of
Expression and the Function of the Courts, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1951).
178. See MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, COLD WAR POLTICAL JUSTICE: THE SMITH ACT, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY, AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 77 (1977). Belknap describes in detail
the demonstrations and political moves made during the trial. See, e.g., id. (describing a
demonstration by the Civil Rights Congress in his chapter on the "Battle of Foley Square").
179. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949) (reviewing
ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1948)), reprinted in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 177, at 281,282.
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the law might be "invoked against unpopular minorities." '
If totalitarian worries were unavoidably central to First
Amendment jurisprudence, so too were they an inescapable part of
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Erwin Griswold's slim volume on
the Fifth Amendment published in 1955 makes a direct attack on the
McCarthy era legislative committee hearings and argues for broad
use of the Fifth Amendment. Griswold wants us all to know that the
hearings were ultimately politically driven events when he asks: "Let
us mix in a large measure of television, newsreels, radio, after-session
press releases, and so on. In this atmosphere, why is it not obvious
that disinterestedness retreats to the background, and that this is true
with respect to many controversial legislative investigations?"1
Making the totalitarian turn explicit, Griswold uses the dangers of
Stalinism as an argument against McCarthyism: "We will gain
nothing in this country if we adopt the methods of the communists to
protect ourselves against communists.""' And then to emphasize this
irony he quotes from Kulski's The Soviet Regime on the totalitarian
mind:
The totalitarian mind accepts all the means which promise the
achievement of its ends. A political democrat is ready to
compromise some of his ideal ends for the sake of renouncing
means which would involve the sacrifice of human lives or
freedom. This is the major moral issue dividing any totalitarian,
be he Communist or Fascist, from a genuine democrat.'"
Here Griswold turns George Kennan's analysis of Soviet
obsessiveness about security on its head, suggesting that we too have
been misguided by "The Illusion of Security.""18 In the specific
context of the Fifth Amendment, Griswold asserts that, although we
tend to think in "historical terms" about the Fifth Amendment
privilege, we need instead to think about the power of the modem
state and to confront "the standard operating procedures of the
police states which have brought the medieval techniques up to
date.' ' "H Over the course of his book, the dean of Harvard Law
School pulled out all the stops and constructed an image of the
legislative investigation as a symptom of a police state that created
peril for the individual.
181. Id. at 1175 n.19.
182. ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 64 (1955).
183. Id. at 70.
184. Id. (quoting WLADYSLAW WSZEBOR KULSKI, THE SOVIET REGIME: COMMUNISM IN
PRACTICE (1954)).
185. Id. at 72 (quoting the title of a speech by George F. Kennan). Kennan was himself
quite cognizant of the domestic threat.
186. ld. at 75.
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It may have been rather natural for both First and Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence to provide a platform for anxious
thoughts about totalitarianism. The question that remains, however,
is whether those same or similar anxious thoughts invaded the
broader jurisprudential arguments of the postwar period. Here, I am
not thinking about the occasional forays onto more general
intellectual terrain, such as Harold Berman's essay on The Devil and
Soviet Russia published in The American Scholar in 1958.1" Rather, I
am thinking of the central jurisprudential developments of postwar
legal thought, especially the ongoing debate on judicial review and
the role of the courts, as well as the emphasis on the legal process.
B. The Marshall Bicentennial Conference and "Government
Under Law"
For this analysis, we can find a particularly interesting artifact in
the proceedings of the bicentennial celebration of John Marshall's
birth, held at Harvard Law School in September 1955 and published
under the title Government Under Law.'" The conference was a sort
of gathering of the clan-if rather Harvard-centric-of the legal
establishment. Emblematic is the frontispiece for the published
proceedings labeled "a galaxy of justices," which pictures Erwin
Griswold, Felix Frankfurter, and Earl Warren sitting around a table
with the Chief Justices of Canada, South Africa, and Australia and
the Master of the Rolls of England-the list, I think, says a great
deal. And as one flips through the volume, there are plenty of
photographs of McGeorge Bundy with his trademark clear plastic
frames, Earl Warren smirking in a picture with James Casner, Henry
M. Hart with his eyebrows raised, Louis Hartz gripping the lectern,
Thurgood Marshall with his thin mustache, Father Joseph Snee in his
clerical collar in front of a WBGH microphone, Herbert Wechsler
with a copy of Father Snee's paper in front of him, and so forth. The
photographs suggest three days of serious, important discussion, and
one might imagine a good deal of pious homily; what else would one
expect for a self-consciously monumental conference on
"Government Under Law" in 1955? But, of course, the words
"government under law" in 1955 pointed to their opposite,
government unencumbered by law, the totalitarian state, and in this
perfect mid-1950s platform for addressing totalitarianism I would
like to ask just how central totalitarian anxieties were to the
187. Harold J. Berman, The Devil and Soviet Russia, 27 AM. SCHOLAR 147 (1958)..
188. GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW: A CONFERENCE HELD AT HARVARD LAW SCHOOL ON
THE OCCASION OF THE BICENTENNIAL OF JOHN MARSHALL, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED
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proceedings."s
The first address of the conference was delivered by Felix
Frankfurter on "John Marshall and the Judicial Function."
Frankfurter turned mid-lecture to his main theme, the judicial
function, but in the transition he described his role in the conference
as "that of the Greek chorus."'" Here he quoted Haigh's The Attic
Theatre to the effect that the role of the chorus at the height of
development of Greek theater was to be "removed from the stress
and turmoil of the action into a calmer and more remote region,
though it still preserves its interest in the events upon the stage.....
"This," Frankfurter continued, "clearly is my cue, rather than the
later still more receding role of the chorus, whereby it 'begins to lose
even its interest in the action' and 'sings odes of a mythological
character, which have only the remotest connextion with the
incidents of the plot'."'" It is difficult to read this characterization of
his role in the conference without detecting in it a figure for his role
as a judge, like his suggestion in the next paragraph of his intention
not to stray "outside [his] confining judicial curtilage."'93 Frankfurter
was indeed moving to use the forum as an opportunity to give voice
to his philosophy of judicial restraint.'
Frankfurter understood well that "judicial review is a deliberate
check upon democracy through an organ of government not subject
to popular control."'95 But for him, the real bedrock of democracy
was not the court's review function but rather the habits of the
society in which the court sat: "What matters most is whether the
standards of reason and fair dealing are bred in the bones of people.
Hyde Park represents a devotion to free speech far more dependable
in its assurances, though unprotected by formal constitutional
requirement, than reliance upon the litigious process for its
enjoyment."'" Frankfurter confidently described the function of law
189. David Hollinger provides an excellent model for the analysis of an academic
conference in his chapter "Two NYUs and 'The Obligation of Universities to the Social Order'
in the Great Depression," in DAVID A HOLLINGER, SCIENCE, JEWS, AND SECULAR
CULTURE: STUDIES IN MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 60-
96 (1996).
190. Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW, supra note 188, at 6, 14.
191. Id. at 15 (citing A.E. HAIGH, THE ATrIC THEATRE 320-21 (Oxford, The Clarendon
Press, 2d ed. 1898)).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Frankfurter began his move to judicial restraint by referring to himself as "[o]ne
brought up in the traditions of James Bradley Thayer [who was a keystone for both
Frankfurter's and Hand's judicial restraint], echoes of whom were still resounding in this very
building in [his] student days." Id.
195. Id. at 19.
196. Id. at 28.
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as "an enveloping and permeating habituation of behavior, reflecting
the counsels of reason on the part of those entrusted with power in
reconciling the pressures of conflicting interests."1 Frankfurter
described judging as difficult, especially the exercise of judicial
review. It was, indeed, a difficult task for a judge to enter into an
arena of political passions: "Only for those who have not the
responsibility of decision can it be easy to decide the grave and
complex problems [political passions] raise, especially in
controversies that excite public interest."198
It is significant that Frankfurter's discussion of judicial restraint
adopts the sort of language others reserve for totalitarianism and
applies it to the hazards of misguided judicial review. He talks about
the "drastic" veto power, "this danger," and a "dangerous sham.""
And in his final paragraph, he warns that courts exercising their
technical jurisdiction are able to "release contagious
consequences."2" In Frankfurter's talk, it turns out that the courts,
not the mob or the authoritarian state, bring danger and contagion.
Nevertheless, it was clear that Frankfurter and his fellow judges had
an important charge in the liberal state:
[S]ince the grounds of decisions and their general direction
suffuse the public mind and the operations of government,
judges cannot free themselves from the responsibility of the
inevitable effect of their opinions in constricting or promoting
the force of law throughout government. Upon no functionaries
is there a greater duty to promote law.21
Frankfurter was, of course, still caught up in the old progressive
critique of the Lochner-era courts. His central admonition did not
focus on the evils of totalitarianism, either the threat of uncontrolled
centralized power or the threat of uncontrollable popular passions.
Rather, Frankfurter addressed the audience gathered in Austin Hall
on the dangers posed by the courts; for him, the judiciary was hardly
the least dangerous branch. The perils of totalitarianism were, of
course, not lost on him. He spoke in the familiar rhetoric of crisis,
whether "excite[d] public interest" or "contagious consequences."
And if there were no imaginable peril, he would not have needed to
assure his audience about the "deeply grounded rule of law" in the
people.2° Ultimately, however, Frankfurter was not speaking the
same language as the social scientists distressed about the totalitarian
197. Id.
198. Id. at 20.
199. Id. at 20-21.
200. Id. at 31.
201. Id.
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state. Rather, he was deeply engaged in a self-reflexive critique of
the American judiciary. And if the most visible danger came from
the overactive judge, it becomes clear that Frankfurter had not really
appeared in the role of a Greek chorus, for he was in the midst of the
main action. As I will suggest, there were a number of speakers at
the Marshall bicentennial for whom totalitarianism was an important
reference point. Nevertheless, Frankfurter's opening address is just
the first sign of the separate track that postwar legal discourse took,
of its distance from the anxieties expressed in political and social
science writing.
If one works through the various papers of the conference as well
as the transcripts of the discussion that ensued after each talk, one
finds a variety of references to totalitarianism generically, and
specifically to the Nazi and Soviet regimes. One can also find
numerous suggestions of "danger," such as John Lord O'Brian's
warning of the "grave danger.., presented by the larger aspects of
the so-called programs to ensure loyalty and security" that can
subject an American to "inquisitions relating not only to his acts but
his private convictions, his aspirations and his attitude toward
government."'2 3 The Cassandra tones of Walter Lippmann's just-
published The Public Philosophy appear in several talks, and Paul
Freund ended his comments with a "solemn" note from Reinhold
Niebuhr's The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness.'
Fundamentally, the Marshall bicentennial conference provided a
forum for cautionary pronouncements on overly powerful
government on the one hand and an overwrought public on the
other. The organizers of the conference had established four basic
themes that could only encourage discussions of the place of
totalitarianism: "Government as Protector of the People against the
Government," "Government under Law in Time of Crisis," "The
Meaning of Due Process," and "The Value of Constitutionalism
Today." 5 Yet, even though these topics would easily admit
203. John Lord O'Brian, The Value of Constitutionalism Today, in GOVERNMENT UNDER
LAW, supra note 188, at 507, 518.
204. Paul Freund, Comment, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at 355, 358-
59 (quoting REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS (1944)). One even finds a foreign speaker like Andre Tunc forced to proclaim
defensively that the French government also had appropriate protections against governmental
abuse. "A comparison between American and French practices may even lead to the
conclusion that the French courts, while they refuse to review legislation and while they have
rarely to render such a spectacular decision as the Steel Seizure Case, exercise on executive and
administrative action at least as severe a control as the American courts." Andrd Tunc,
Government Under Law. A Civilian View, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at
35, 50.
205. See Erwin N. Griswold, Foreword to GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at
v, vi.
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atmospheric anxieties about totalitarianism, the conference based on
Marshall's contribution to constitutionalism was unambiguously a
conference about judicial review. The question, then, is whether the
conference as it played out focused on the role of the judiciary as a
bulwark against totalitarian threats. Or rather, did it become so
embroiled in a judiciary-centric discourse that the threat of
totalitarianism, even when explicit, was not really at the heart of the
discussion? For this examination, I would like to begin with the talk
given by Father Joseph Snee of Georgetown and the comments that
followed by Herbert Wechsler and Henry M. Hart, before turning to
Charles Wyzanski's talk on Constitutionalism: Limitation and
Affirmation.
The first page of Joseph Snee's Leviathan at the Bar of Justice is
filled with a series of dangers. "We Americans," he tells his
audience, "have long been accustomed to take for granted the merits
of democracy and personal liberty and to regard the theory of
limitations upon government as a matter for academic discussion."'
The "take for granted" telegraphs the warning that arrives in the
following sentence: "Two world wars and the recrudescence of
totalitarian governments in our own 'enlightened' age have startled
that complacency. ' We are, it seems, still on the note of popular
perception when he says that it is now "a commonplace to say that
we live in an era of crisis," and he talks of the "danger, real or
apparent, of internal subversion."2 But mid-sentence Snee commits
himself, for that danger "presents a particularly strong temptation to
bypass the orderly procedure of law and to adopt the processes of
force which seem so much more quick and effective."'  Here he
perceives a move to the "principle that the end justifies the means,"
which, he states just before turning to Walter Lippmann, "is as fatal
to a life of democratic freedom as it is to sound morality."21
We should not be surprised to see the turn to morality from a
Georgetown Jesuit, and as expected, we see him on the very next
page begin to invoke natural law.21' An avowed Thomist, Snee
expresses the Catholic natural law response to the legal relativism
that Edward Purcell describes in The Crisis of Democratic Theory.212
But Snee does not seem to dwell very long on natural law. Instead,
206. Joseph M. Snee, Leviathan at the Bar of Justice, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra
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he transforms his natural law viewpoint by positing a dichotomy
between "power" and "authority." And in describing power and its
limits, he makes the transition from Maritain to the political thinkers
Mcllwain, Corwin, Madison, and Jefferson.213 "The story of political
theory," he tells us, "is that of a quest for effective means of limiting
the exercise of governmental power and for philosophical
justifications of such limitation.""21 He continues in this vein by
observing that "the problem of justification becomes particularly
acute in a democratic society, where representative government is
responsive to the will of the people. 215 Snee returns several times to
Lippmann's The Public Philosophy, even ending his address on
Lippmann's advice that "[n]o more than the kings before them
should the people be hedged with divinity." '216 In the end, Snee turns
to the Court for protection from a wayward majority. "Despite its
inherent conservatism, perhaps because of it," Snee asserts, "I
believe that the Court in placing a temporary check upon the legal
effectuation of the popular will, particularly in the area of human
rights, fulfills and was meant to fulfill an essential function in a free
and democratic society." '217 But for Snee the authority of the Court
itself depends upon the commitment of the populace to
constitutional limits. To this effect he asserts that "[u]nless the
members of the body politic are convinced of the permanent, long-
term value of the constitutional guarantees of liberty and of the
supremacy of law and reason over will, there is no power on earth
which will serve to preserve these freedoms and the American
tradition." 8
Snee's nightmare is Lippmann's-government's power to coerce in
the hands of an unchecked majority that has lost touch with the
"public philosophy." The present check against that majority is not
so much provided by the Constitution or the Court as by popular
devotion to the "ideal of freedom."2 9 Snee has introduced a strange
circularity-the only defense against destructive popular energies is
embedded in the people themselves. But that very circularity also
suggests our vulnerability. For if, as his quotation from Lippmann
indicates, the people are losing their grounding in public
213. He does circle back explicitly to "natural" law when he explains: "Over and above the
positive rights guaranteed in the Constitution, there exist natural rights there enshrined." Snee,
supra note 206, at 129. But mostly he lets Frankfurter's "canons of decency and fairness" stand
in for natural law. I&. at 115.
214. Id. at 105.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 130 (quoting LIPPMANN, supra note 106, at 14).
217. Id. at 126.
218. Id. at 129.
219. Id.
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commitment, then the threat emerges from an authoritarian
government at the direction of a repressive majority. This was not a
hypothetical concern, for as Snee mentions in his informal
comments: "[I]t is in times of crisis, such as we are experiencing now,
that there comes a temptation to do away with [the] slow processes
of truly democratic and liberal government. It's then more than ever
that we need protection against a majority.""22
Herbert Wechsler's short comment on Snee's paper stands as a
rehearsal for his famous article of 1959, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law."' Wechsler begins by neutralizing Father Snee's
Thomism. He does this by asserting that "[a] constitution, we might
say, would be ill suited for a varied people, nursing philosophic
among other factions, if it could not draw support from almost any
system of ideas by which a decent man may think that he explains
the moral universe and lives." '222 Then he turns rather quickly to focus
on the "mechanisms by which government may be employed as a
protector of the people against the government,"223 which of course
meant the courts. For Wechsler, the role of the courts was rather
modest, basically performing the function of "an instrument of sober
second thought by the political branches.""22 After describing the
"neutrality and generality of formulation" by the courts2 -
prefiguring his 1959 essay-he explains again the courts' role in
bringing attention to the rights of individuals and minorities. 6
Wechsler is quite frank about the courts' slim role: "In thinking of
the possibilities of using government as a protector of the people
against government, meaning in practice using one organ of power or
authority to check alleged abuses by another, the Constitution
provides no more than minimal solutions; the real challenge is one to
legislation."227 Wechsler may speak of a "challenge" and of the
"reasonable claims of individuals and minorities," but there does not
seem to be much of a threat looming over his world; at most, there is
a need for a "sober second thought." Behind Wechsler's push
towards neutrality is his obvious agitation about the excessively
220. Id. at 130, 133.
221. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
222. Herbert Wechsler, Comment, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at 134,
135.
223. Id. at 136.
224. Id. at 137.
225. Id. at 138.
226. Here he states that "the judicial function largely serves to further fair attention in the
legislative process to the reasonable claims of individuals and minorities asserting fundamental
rights." Id.
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political performances of the Supreme Court.2' But what is
interesting about Wechsler's neutrality is that it represents an
attempt to de-politicize the judiciary while showing no anxiety about
the politics of the other branches of government. We are, it seems, in
a world in which the main protection needed was a "sober second
thought."
In his own comment on Snee's paper, Henry Melvin Hart, Jr.,
begins with the old Learned Hand chestnut: "A society so riven that
the spirit of moderation is gone, no court can save.., a society
where that spirit flourishes no court need save." Hart suggests that
he "cannot help believing that Judge Hand, when he wrote that, had
his attention on the turning of a phrase. '29 The problem with Hand's
formula, in Hart's mind, is that its search for elegant polarity loses
sight of the center, exemplifying the "fallacy of the undistributed
middle. ' '21 Societies, Hart explains, are not easily divided into the
two extreme camps."' Clearly, for Hart, the formula does not fit the
United States well: "In particular, it isn't what American society is
like. A society is something in process-in process of becoming. It
has always within it, as ours does, seeds of dissension. And it also has
within it forces making for moderation and mutual
accommodation. '23 2 At this point, Hart turns to the role of the courts
and whether they are charged with moderating society. 3 The more
important turn in Hart's paper is not his flattening out of Hand's
rhetoric, but rather his response to Snee's search for "effective
means for limiting the exercise of governmental power and for
philosophical justifications for such limitation."'  Hart responds by
moving away from a preoccupation with governmental abuse: "The
political problem is not simply negative. It is a delusion to suppose,
as so many people have, that if only you can prevent the abuse of
governmental power everything else will be all right.""5
Rejecting excessive concern with government intrusion, Hart tells
us that "[t]he political problem is a problem also of eliciting from
government officials, and from the members of the society generally,
the affirmative, creative performances upon which the well-being of
228. See KALMAN, supra note 23, at 41.
229. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at 139,
140 (quoting Learned Hand). On Hand's stylistic extravagances, see Landauer, supra note 6, at
231, 254-55.
230. Hart, supra note 229, at 140.
231. In Hart's words, "that isn't what societies are like." Id.
232. Id. at 140-41.
233. "The question-the relevant question-is whether the courts have a significant
contribution to make in pushing American society in the direction of moderation." Id. at 141.
234. Id.
235. Id. (emphasis in original).
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society depends. '236 From his perspective, all of the constitutional
protections considered over the course of the conference -whether
judicial review, the guarantees of the Bill of Rights or the separation
of powers-were "presented as devices, essentially, for avoiding the
abuse of official power rather than as instruments also for eliciting to
the full the creative potentialities both of citizens generally and of
those citizens who become officials. 237
For Hart, this is every bit as much description as prescription, and
in his one reference to totalitarianism, he states that "[p]robably a
majority of Americans thought of World War II as a struggle
between the dread efficiency of totalitarianism and the pleasant
wastefulness of a democratic life"; he responds that "it isn't true that
our system is inefficient." 8 Ultimately, government in America is
about creating the "conditions which will release to the uttermost the
enormous resources of private ordering of social affairs, of private
adjustment of social difficulties, of private creativity. '239 Hart is thus
ushering us into the America of Willard Hurst's "release of creative
human energy."2' That is law's function and purpose. There seem to
be few anxious moments-even Hart's advocacy of "release" is not
paired with worries about "restriction." Concerns about
totalitarianism or any of the social ills for which totalitarianism
provided a figure are significantly absent.
Charles Wyzanski, then Judge of the U.S. District Court for the
District of Massachusetts and a former clerk for both Learned and
Augustus Noble Hand, spends almost half of his paper establishing a
dichotomy between the naive lay view and the sophisticated legal
theorist's view of constitutionalism. "To the layman," he writes,
"constitutionalism never stood in higher esteem than now. The
cruelties of Nazi and Soviet totalitarian regimes have ... focused
popular concern upon the need of some avowed limitations upon
political authority." '241 By contrast to these lay imaginings informed
by totalitarian nightmare, Wyzanski depicts the academic's worldly
skepticism. For the academic, he recites all of the complications of
modern society: "Whatever country may be our residence, we live in
a mass democracy founded on a refined technology and administered
by a managerial class controlling vast organizations."242 Along with
236. Id.
237. Id. at 142.
238. Id. at 143.
239. Id. at 144.
240. HURST, supra note 64, at 5.
241. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Constitutionalism: Limitation and Affirmation, in
GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW, supra note 188, at 473,473.
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references to "mass media" and to Joseph Schumpeter-touchstones
of contemporary social and political thought-Wyzanski says that
"[u]nder the view just stated constitutionalism sinks into a minor role
in political theory."243 In this modern society, then, constitutionalism
has lost its privileged status. From there Wyzanski turns to what he
describes as a "kindred deprecatory view of conventional
laudation," ' a view that denies the innate corrosive nature of power.
He uses this in turn to introduce its specifically American rendition,
a skepticism towards constitutionalism and judicial review espoused
by Learned Hand. Here, like others, he pulls out the familiar Hand
line that proclaimed that a society where the spirit of moderation
"flourishes no court need save."
245
When Wyzanski first establishes the lay/professional dichotomy,
he seems to be drawing caricatures to be used essentially as foils, and
he readily admits as much. 46 But only a few pages later, referring to
"we professionals, 247 Wyzanski forces us to abandon the assumption
that he has created a false dichotomy in order to be able to occupy
the solid center. There his professionalism was sociological: What
"we professionals" seem to know is that "[a]ll liberties are the result
of social process''2' and therefore are not absolute. Wyzanski uses
this explicitly sociological turn to suggest his alliance with Hand and
to observe that "the doctrines of constitutionalism constitute not law
but the sort of myth which has as its chief worth the encouragement
of a continuity of customary habits and a spirit of moderation."2 9 But
just at that point, Wyzanski seems to reverse himself from the earlier
skepticism. "Before we jump to embrace this self-deprecatory
skeptical seer," he states, "let us ask ourselves why it is that no
constitutional state seems ever to have existed without independent
courts ... .,,250 His talk even builds to a sentence about the "courts
being teachers to the citizenry. 25
1
At this point in his seeming oscillation, Wyzanski distances himself
from both of what he describes as the lay and professional
viewpoints. He does this by criticizing the "oft-repeated contention
that both in popular estimation and in legal character the chief role
of constitutionalism is negative- a system for the division, limitation,
243. Id. at 477.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 479 (quoting Learned Hand) (emphasis in original).
246. "The foregoing contrast between the attitudes of the applauding unsophisticated
layman and the critical informed professional is admittedly exaggerated." Id.
247. Id. at 484.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 485.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 486.
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and restraint of power to prevent its abuse. '252 This is the import of
the title of Wyzanski's talk, Constitutionalism: Limitation and
Affirmation. Wyzanski is able to announce his own view of
constitutionalism as "the institutionalization of the principle that the
state's goal is the increase in opportunities for the development of
the individual as the seat of ultimate spiritual, political, and creative
authority." 3 Here he takes Hart's line. He urges his audience to
transcend the notion of constitutional liberty as "being always a
problem of freedom from state intervention and never a problem of
freedom through state action. '254 Wyzanski's final turn, then, is
hardly the jaded skepticism of the professional. Indeed, he professes
"faith," which he tells us "has virtue in politics and in law as in
religion." 5 As I have suggested, the rhetoric of Wyzanski's paper
repeatedly shifts in its relation to the poles of popular faith in
constitutionalism and sociological skepticism, so that he can finally
come upon a sociologically sophisticated faith. To pinpoint where
totalitarianism resides in Wyzanksi's oscillations, we must remember
that it appears prominently in his initial portrait of lay
constitutionalism. But what is interesting about Wyzanski is that
over the course of his paper he transforms the na've popular faith
from a constitutional defensive, or negative, strategy to a positive
one. Thus, not only is his layman's constitutionalism basically more
optimistic than anxious, Wyzanski ultimately adopts a faith even less
touched by anxiety.
The conference commemorating the bicentennial of John
Marshall's birth was, as announced in the title of the proceedings,
Government Under Law, a celebration of John Marshall's role in
forging legal controls over government. In a very real sense, the
conference commemorated the role of judicial review set in motion
by John Marshall and the place of Marbury v. Madison 6 in the
development of the legal system of the United States as well as its
impact abroad. And in 1955, Government Under Law was quite
conscious about the totalitarian alternative, government
unencumbered by law. Yet, despite the important role of
totalitarianism in the conference, that role-even in this very public
celebration of constitutional limits-was muted and diffused in
comparison to the anxious expressions of social and political
scientists. Instead of worries about abuse of power from above or
irrational explosiveness from below, there were the old concerns
252. Id.
253. Id. at 487.
254. Id. at 488.
255. Id. at 490.
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about an abusive judiciary, which hardly fit the totalitarian model,
and pronouncements on government as a positive force. Perhaps the
New Deal ideology was too strong in the law schools. One should not
be surprised to find Charles Wyzanski, the former Solicitor for the
Department of Labor, using a conference on Government Under
Law as an opportunity to talk about "government through law."
C. The Legal Process, Spoiled Cantaloupes, and the Nature of Law
In their introduction to Hart and Sacks's The Legal Process -the
mimeographed course materials taught at Harvard and numerous
other law schools in the 1950s and 1960s-William Eskridge and
Philip Frickey trace the book's genealogy through several other
incarnations and teaching materials to an "organic rationality"
encouraged by the appearance of totalitarianism. Drawing from
Edward Purcell, they maintain that "the realist-rationalist debate
reached extraordinary proportions between 1938 and 1941,
apparently because of anxieties felt by American intellectuals in light
of the rise of fascism in Europe and reports of the Nazi atrocities
against minority ethnic and religious groups." 7 What resulted, in
part embodied by Lon Fuller's The Law in Quest of Itself, 8 was a
new model of rationalism that fused the organic, historical
movement of legal positivism-as opposed to a natural law stance-
with a renewed moralism.259 For Eskridge and Frickey, this renewed
moralism lay behind Hart and Sacks's pronouncement that "[f]aw is
a doing of something, a purposive activity, a continuous striving to
solve the basic problems of social living."2" In this genealogy, then,
The Legal Process's reasoned elaboration of purposive law had its
genesis in anxieties about the Nazi state and the inability of legal
positivism to deal with it, so much so that Eskridge and Frickey
entitle their section on the early prehistory of The Legal Process,
"Organic Rationality (Totalitarianism in Europe, 1921-41).11261
In describing the movement of the legal process school from
substance to procedure, Morton Horwitz writes:
Whether due to fear of conservative attacks on the ideal of
"collaborative, cooperative living" or anxiety that any
257. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to
The Legal Process, in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at li, lxv (1994).
258. LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940).
259. "As reinterpreted by scholars like Fuller, legal rationalism pressed the idea that law is
policy toward an insistence that law be good policy, which was understood in an organic way to
mean 'purposive'." Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 257, at lxvii.
260. Id. at xci-xcii (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 257, at 148).
261. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 257, at lxii.
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substantive conception of the common interest might
degenerate into totalitarianism, The Legal Process expresses the
belief of a dominant postwar generation of elite legal thinkers
that "procedures... are obviously more fundamental than...
substantive arrangements. ... "262
Horwitz's explanation may be set at a level of abstraction one degree
higher than Eskridge and Frickey, but he, too, sees worries about
totalitarianism informing The Legal Process. So too does Laura
Kalman. In her description of the process theorists, she writes:
"Haunted by the memories of the conservative Court in the early
twentieth century and threatened by Stalinism, such legal scholars
sought to domesticate realism, constrain judges, and separate law
from politics."263 In Eskridge, Frickey, Horwitz, and Kalman, we find
Hart and Sacks framed by references to totalitarianism, whether in
their purposive response to the relativism of legal realism or their
avoidance of substance or politicized law as potentially totalitarian.
We should turn to The Legal Process itself to see whether we can
tease out of its depiction of the American legal process an underlying
concern with totalitarianism.
Hart and Sacks begin The Legal Process by citing the growth in the
world's population: "In 1789 when the American republic was
established some 800 million people inhabited the globe. Today,
there are about 2,500 millions and the number is steadily
increasing. ' '2' But they do this not so much to suggest a threat as a
challenge. "These human beings," they write, "have a great variety
of wants, ranging from the common urge to secure the simple
necessities of physical existence to the most subtle desires to achieve
some sense of oneness with the universe."' 5 In the next paragraph
Hart and Sacks pronounce one of their major themes, that of human
interdependence: "In the satisfactions of all their wants, people are
continuously and inescapably dependent upon one another. ' '2' For
Hart and Sacks, this is the core concern of social science: "The
coexistence on the face of the same planet of these ever-changing
and increasing millions of people, having these wants and such
abilities to satisfy the wants under these conditions of
interdependence, are the basic facts of social science and pose its
basic problems.
267
It is at this point, having not yet mentioned the place of law, that
262. HORWITZ, supra note 15, at 255 (citing HART & SACKS, supra note 257, at 3-4).
263. KALMAN, supra note 23, at 41.
264. HART & SACKS, supra note 257, at 1.
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Hart and Sacks make a transition, if in an inelegant equation, to their
own discipline: "Law being a pervasive aspect of social science, the
questions [of social science] pose problems which are basic also for
lawyers."'2 We find in the opening paragraphs of The Legal Process
Hart and Sacks framing the nature and purpose of law as basically
distributive in character-law asks whose wants and which ones are
to be encouraged or discouraged. Law hardly starts out its life in the
pages of The Legal Process by summoning protections against the
despotic state. Rather than a concern with "government under law,"
it is a system of allocation to which we are introduced.
Hart and Sacks next begin to develop the theme of
interdependence as community, but rather than the pathological
"quest for community" that we hear from Robert Nisbet,269 Hart and
Sacks talk more banally of interdependence as resulting in a
"community of interest" and the creation of human groups. This is
where law enters: "People need understandings about the kinds of
conduct which must be avoided if cooperation is to be maintained.""27
Such understandings are not enough by themselves. Society needs a
way to continue to clarify these understandings as it develops and a
way to resolve disputes over these understandings.
This is where Hart and Sacks make their famous move to
procedure, and they assert that
substantive understandings or arrangements about how the
members of an interdependent community are to conduct
themselves in relation to each other and to the community
necessarily imply the existence of what may be called
constitutive or procedural understandings or arrangements about
how questions in connection with arrangements of both types
are to be settled.271
Horwitz is quite correct to move in his narrative of postwar legal
thought from the legal process school to the process pluralism of
Robert Dahl's A Preface to Democratic Theory, for both assume a
basic procedural agreement at the core of social ordering.72 But
unlike Dahl, with his Madisonian 6tudes that address the "tyranny of
the majority," Hart and Sacks write without threats either from an
overpowering government or an overpowering populace. Rather,
they create a mixed world of private and public ordering in which the
"processes of private and official decision constantly interact" 3 but
268. Id.
269. See generally NISBET, supra note 55.
270. HART & SACKS, supra note 257, at 3.
271. Id. (emphasis in original).
272. See HORwrrz, supra note 15, at 254-57.
273. HART & SACKS, supra note 257, at 7.
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do not seem to threaten each other.
The first case in this casebook is "the case of the spoiled
cantaloupes" about a fruit and vegetable wholesaler who was
shipped a carload of cantaloupes (sold on a "rolling acceptance final
basis") that turned out to be decaying as a result of "clasdosporium
rot." '274 This may strike any American law school graduate as the
standard stuff of casebooks, with all those wonderful who-deserves-
what vignettes of the genre. But Hart and Sacks take fifty-seven
pages to go through an entire range of "public" and "private"
ordering implicated by the case. They quote extensively from the
Code of Federal Regulation setting out the Department of
Agriculture's standard for what it means for a cantaloupe to be "U.S.
Grade No. 1," and to be "free from sunscald and decay" '275 as well as
from the Department's definition of "rolling acceptance final." 76
Among the various ordering factors, they describe the impact of
state law as well as "trade practice and understanding" before
turning to the administrative disposition of the case in 1946, followed
by the three federal court cases that stretched into 1948.
Hart and Sacks organize the "Notes and Queries" that follow the
case materials by "perspectives": "The Problem Through Martinelli's
Eyes," "The Problem Through the Secretary's Eyes," "The Problem
Through the Courts' Eyes," and "The Problem from an Olympian
Point of View." The Notes and Queries contain all sorts of questions
about fairness and ethics. For example, the series of questions at the
end of the cantaloupe problem includes a question about whether
the recipient of the cantaloupes had a "good reason to believe that it
was legally free to abandon the carload to the railroad?... Was it
ethical for it [to] do so?''"7 Similarly, Hart and Sacks ask: "Does
justice require that people be told in advance what will happen to
them if they do wrong so that they will be better able to judge
whether to do right?" '278 There are suggestions about consistency and
questions about the court's role if it "had relied solely upon an
intuitive ad hoc sense of what is fair." '279 In their discussion of the
"Olympian Point of View," Hart and Sacks turn to a comparative
question about the Soviet system in the context of the need for "[a]n
adequate supply of fresh fruits and vegetables": "Consider whether
the opportunities for the supply of winter fruits and vegetables
within the Soviet Union, with its single national market governed by
274. Id. at 10-11.
275. Id. at 17 n.10.
276. Id. at 19.
277. Id. at 60.
278. Id.
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a single institutional system, are comparable to those in the United
States." This note is followed by the kicker: "Is the Soviet system
better adapted to securing a good supply?"'  They push the
comparison further: "Think, in particular, about the various
assignments of legal power as well as the distribution of practical
ability to make effective decisions which the law governing the
interstate trade in fresh fruits and vegetables in the United States
exhibits.""l
We have at the end of Hart and Sacks's cantaloupe odyssey one of
the very few explicit references in The Legal Process to the
totalitarian state, and the clear implication of the comparison is the
superiority of the American legal system with its multiple levels of
legal ordering. All of those legal actors, the list of factors of private
and public ordering, and the various "perspectives" of the notes
constitute the legal process. It is not so much pluralistic as multi-
layered. But amidst the multiple layers, one of the constant refrains
of The Legal Process is the word "technique." Hart and Sacks
repeatedly refer to various "techniques," as in their discussion of
"The Development of More Elaborate Techniques: Regulation
Through Delegated Rulemaking Power"m-even to the extent of
being able to refer to a "technique of non-control."' Ironically, the
word "techniques," as well as "controls," another constantly
repeated word in The Legal Process, summon up democratic faith
more than they suggest the technocratic clich6s of the totalitarian
state. Fundamentally, Hart and Sacks's legal order is a complicated
machinery of techniques and controls, and their democracy relies on
just those devices. Repeating Hart's argument from the Marshall
commemorative, Hart and Sacks state that
the problem of government is primarily affirmative and not
negative. Abuses, both private and official, have to be
prevented, so far as they feasibly can be. But what was
ultimately important was the elicitation of the affirmative
performances, both of officials and private persons, which were
needed to maximize the satisfactions of human wants.'
The real check "upon official behavior" is "provided by institutional
understandings, including both craft techniques and accepted ideals
of how officials ought to behave.""3 Interestingly, it is not the
Constitution that provides this check. In fact, according to Hart and
280. Id. at 67.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 915.
283. Id. at 845.
284. Id. at 157.
285. Id.
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Sacks, "[c]onstitutional impediments to centralized direction, in
those matters in which there is no compelling need for national
action, appear as safeguards against impairments of the viability of
the social mechanism as a whole." ' The Constitution's role here is
to assure "alternative means of working out by common action,
through various groupings of interest, solutions of problems which
cannot be settled unilaterally."'
As is clear from these passages, The Legal Process expresses none
of the anxiety either about the abusive state or the uncontrollable
mob that seems to have plagued so much of the social and political
theory of the 1950s. Indeed, Hart and Sacks's course materials show
no particular nervousness about the health of the Republic. But that
does not exclude totalitarianism as a reference point for Hart and
Sacks. Indeed, what is striking about their portrait of the American
legal process is the diffusion of power it implied. As Eskridge and
Frickey point out in their introductory essay, The Legal Process
depicts "a government of dispersed power."' It may be that exactly
such an image of American government could be romanticized only
against the background, even if distant, of the totalitarian state. Hart
and Sacks were not, as Laura Kalman suggested, separating law from
politics so much as they were making law very political-except that
the politics were multi-layered and dispersed. But even if
totalitarianism is an implicit point of comparison in The Legal
Process, the book contains no hint of anxiety and no concern about
the state of American society.
D. Lon Fuller's Inner Morality and Herbert Wechsler's Neutrality
Edward Purcell identified Lon Fuller's 1940 lectures on The Law
in Quest of Itselff as part of the attack on positivism as a road to
totalitarianism.2' Fuller would continue to develop his attack on
positivism in his famous 1958 exchange with H.L.A. Hart in the
Harvard Law Review,29' using Hart's nuanced expression of legal
positivism as a foil. Hart maintained that in extreme cases law is
simply "too evil to be obeyed,"2 thereby escaping some of the
criticism of the law-as-command position traditionally associated
with Austinian legal positivism. He spoke about purposive, socially
286. Id. at 160.
287. Id.
288. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 257, at xciv.
289. FULLER, supra note 258.
290. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 161-64.
291. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958); Fuller, supra note 29.
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directed decisions that are made in the penumbra or gaps where a
law is not explicit, while denying that it is morality that enters in the
penumbral decision. Hart's moves did not save him, and, as Richard
Primus points out, the German experience is at the center of Fuller's
answer to Hart.293
For Fuller, the Nazi example was Hart's undoing. "Without any
inquiry into the actual workings of whatever remained of a legal
system under the Nazis," Fuller suggested, "Professor Hart assumes
that something must have persisted that still deserved the name of
law in a sense that would make meaningful the ideal of fidelity to
law. ' '2' Fuller was quick to point out that, for Hart, disobedience to
the Nazi state "presented not a mere question of prudence or
courage, but a genuine moral dilemma in which the ideal of fidelity
to law had to be sacrificed in favor of more fundamental goals."295
For Fuller, the Nazi example finally disproved the positivist position
and its emphasis on fidelity to law. And even though he briefly
moved out of his discussion of the Nazis by claiming that "[i]t is not
necessary, however, to dwell on such moral upheavals as the Nazi
regime to see how completely incapable the positivistic philosophy is
of serving the one high moral ideal it professes, that of fidelity to
law, ' '2' Fuller does indeed "dwell" on the Nazi example.
After debating Hart on the postwar legal difficulties created by the
emergence from the Nazis and the position of the German legal
theorist Gustav Radbruch, Fuller turns to the most biting part of his
attack on legal positivism and his suggestion of a "causal connection"
between positivism and the rise of the Nazis. He sets the stage by
declaring that "[it should be recalled that in the seventy-five years
before the Nazi regime the positivistic philosophy had achieved in
Germany a standing such as it enjoyed in no other country." 297 And
within a page, although with the disingenuous softness of
circumlocution, he comes to his conclusion: "In the light of these
considerations I cannot see either absurdity or perversity in the
suggestion that the attitudes prevailing in the German legal
profession were helpful to the Nazis."298 To push the point further,
Fuller observed that Hitler "did not come to power by a violent
revolution" but by the "exploitation of legal forms. ''2" Lawyers and
293. See Primus, supra note 25, at 422-24.
294. Fuller, supra note 29, at 633.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 646. Primus also notes that this sentence seems to be an exit out of Fuller's
discussion of the Nazi state, but that Fuller returns to the discussion two pages later. See
Primus, supra note 25, at 433.
297. Fuller, supra note 29, at 658.
298. Id. at 659.
299. Id.
48
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol12/iss2/1
Landauer
judges did not do their part: "The first attacks on the established
order were on ramparts, which, if they were manned by anyone,
were manned by lawyers and judges. These ramparts fell almost
without a struggle."3" Fuller clearly establishes his case: The legal
positivism that dominated German jurisprudence paved the road to
Hitler.
By focusing so dramatically on the Nazis, Hart and Fuller were
playing a high-stakes game. Hart understood fully that the Nazi
example was the main critical weapon against legal positivism, so he
attempted to address the Nazi issue preemptively. °' It was
predictable that Fuller would use the Nazi example to full advantage.
By using the term "game" and "advantage," I do not mean to suggest
that these were not earnest matters for Hart and Fuller.
Nevertheless, as deeply important as these issues were to each of
them, what is interesting is how little all of this talk of Hitler and the
Nazi state seemed to suggest a present threat, a pathology still under
way. Certainly, the Nazi example implied that the road to Hell is
always there, always possible, but Fuller does not make that road
seem very close, nor its totalitarian end imminent. In fact, Fuller is
perhaps at his most interesting in discussing not Germany's path to
totalitarianism but instead, the postwar dilemmas faced by the
Germans in the wake of the Nazis. "Germany," he explains, "had to
restore both respect for law and respect for justice. Though neither
of these could be restored without the other, painful antinomies were
encountered in attempting to restore them both at once, as
Radbruch saw all too clearly."' The troubles the Germans
experienced resolving those antinomies is quite a significant point for
Fuller, but provides no immediacy for the readers of the Harvard
Law Review in 1958.
Only on the last page of his response to Hart, after discussing the
Nazis' coercion of traditionally voluntary acts, did Fuller briefly
come closer to home:
Questions of this sort are undoubtedly becoming more acute as
the state assumes a more active role with respect to economic
activity. No significant economic activity can be organized
exclusively by "don'ts." By its nature economic production
requires a co-operative effort. In the economic field there is
special reason, therefore, to fear that "This you may not do" will
be transformed into "This you must do-but willingly." 3
300. Id.
301. As Primus writes, "[ainticipating one of Fuller's attacks, Hart explicitly denied that
German legal positivism helped the Nazi regime to rise." Primus, supra note 25, at 432.
302. Fuller, supra note 29, at 657.
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This short passage comes across as little more than an aside, even in
its privileged position on the final page of Fuller's essay. If the
double-speak of enforced voluntarism-"This you must do-but
willingly" -has all the Orwellian perverseness of totalitarian thought
patterns, Fuller's essay does not make the threat real.
If Fuller's essay does not suggest a present danger, the
perverseness of enforced voluntarism ties back to his main theme,
the "internal morality of law." In his debate with H.L.A. Hart, Fuller
established an "external" and an "internal" morality of law. For
Fuller, the "authority to make law must be supported by moral
attitudes that accord to it the competency it claims."3" This authority,
Fuller explains, derives from the "morality external to law."3 5 But
the morality that is really critical for Fuller is the "inner morality of
the law," which gives law its principled coherence. "Professor Hart,"
Fuller observes, "seems to assume that evil aims may have as much
coherence and inner logic as good ones."3" To this position Fuller
responds flatly: "I, for one, refuse to accept that assumption."' In
his rejection of an "immoral morality," Fuller states in a feigned
confessional mode: "I shall have to rest on the assertion of a belief
that may seem naive, namely, that coherence and goodness have
more affinity than coherence and evil."'  As Anthony Sebok has
recently described, the key to Fuller's discussion of the Nazis was an
attempt to establish that evil regimes "could never, in principle, have
law."' That explains Fuller's answer to the postwar dilemma created
by the woman who caused her husband to be prosecuted for his
criticisms of Hitler: Fuller maintained that the law under which the
woman had her husband prosecuted had not been law in the first
place.31 But, in a sense, Fuller may have been undermining his own
position. At one point he went so far as to ask: "If we felt that the
law itself was our safest refuge, would it not be because even in the
most perverted regimes there is a certain hesitancy about writing
cruelties, intolerances, and inhumanities into law?"31' Law seems to
have some moral force even in the most evil regimes. And
304. Id. at 645.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 636.
307. Id. This is a key passage in Tony Sebok's analysis of Fuller's position. For Sebok's
discussion, see ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM AND MODERN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 160-69 (1998).
308. Fuller, supra note 29, at 636.
309. SEBOK, supra note 307, at 165.
310. See id. at 219-20. In 1949, the German postwar court that was prosecuting the wife for
having turned her husband over to the Nazis was forced to address her defense, which "rested
on the ground that her husband's statements to her about Hitler and the Nazis constituted a
crime under the laws then in force." Fuller, supra note 29, at 653.
311. Fuller, supra note 29, at 637.
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unwittingly, his discussion of all the "secret" laws of the Nazi state,
despite their obvious perversion of the normal working of law,
suggests a sort of embarrassment on the part of the Nazi state. What
is interesting is not that the laws were secret but that the Nazis felt a
need to refer to law at all. It is clear that they were dealing with a
population culturally accustomed to legal codification.
After setting out the differences between the external and internal
moralities of law, Fuller claims that they "reciprocally influence one
another" and a "deterioration of the one will almost inevitably
produce a deterioration in the other. 3 12 In fact, "[s]o closely related
are they that when the anthropologist Lowie speaks of 'the generally
accepted ethical postulates underlying our.., legal institutions as
their ultimate sanction and guaranteeing their smooth functioning,'
he may be presumed to have both of them in mind."3 '3 This reference
to Robert Lowie is quite telling. Despite the famous final sentence of
Primitive Society in which Lowie spoke of "that planless
hodgepodge, that thing of shreds and patches called civilization,"3 '4
Lowie was basically a functionalist3"5 who pushed a multiple causal
theory of social organization,316  and we can read Lowie's
functionalism back into Fuller's moralities of law and emphasis on
coherence. Ultimately, one may describe Fuller's inner morality as a
procedurally oriented functionalism that, however, rests on "an
assertion of a belief that might seem naive" that it could lead to the
good.
The logical extension of Fuller's "inner morality of law" is Herbert
Wechsler's famous Holmes lecture, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, in which he took the Supreme Court to task for
not basing its decision in Brown"7 on neutral principles that would
not show bias to one group's claim or another's. "A principled
decision, in the sense I have in mind," Wechsler explains, "is one that
rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that
in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved." '318 For Gary Peller, the move to the non-
ideological represented by Wechsler's neutral principles followed
Dewey's lead. Peller explains that Dewey did not equate relativism
312. Id. at 645.
313. Id.
314. ROBERT LOWIE, PRIMITIVE SOCIETY 441 (Liveright 1947) (1920).
315. On the misunderstanding of Lowie's "shreds and patches" line as suggesting Lowie's
overall anti-functionalism, see MARVIN HARRIS, THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY:
A HISTORY OF THEORIES OF CULLTuRE 353 (1968).
316. See, e.g., Robert Lowie, Social Organization, 13/14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 141-48 (Macmillan 1937) (1934).
317. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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with surrender to totalitarianism, as so many of the critics of legal
realism argued.319  Rather, Peller's Dewey saw philosophical
absolutism that encouraged totalitarianism.32" Primus has similarly
found the foundationalist response to totalitarianism matched by
what might be called an anti-foundationalist or, rather, anti-dogmatic
response to totalitarianism, 321 and he has identified Wechsler's
neutral principles argument as a species of the anti-dogmatic
response to totalitarianism, which "stressed the evil of dogmatic
ideologies."3" More specifically, Primus has told us that Wechsler
"explicitly acknowledged that his concern for neutrality had roots in
the confrontation with Nazism and specifically in his experience at
Nuremberg. '3 23 This acknowledgment occurs in interviews for the
Columbia Oral History Research Project.2 In answer to the question
of whether the 1959 Neutral Principles article stemmed from his
Nuremberg experience, Wechsler responded:
I wouldn't put it that way. On the other hand, what I wrote
about Nuremberg-particularly my emphasis on the importance,
in that undertaking, that we judge the enemy only by standards
that we would apply to ourselves-does represent an
articulation of my belief in neutral principles back then. My
whole effort in the Nuremberg thing, in which I think I was on
the whole quite successful in strengthening the natural instinct
of Judge Biddle to perform in this way, was to persuade him that
in reaching judgment at Nuremberg, only standards that we felt
confident we would be ready to apply to ourselves should
prevail.3"
What is clear from this statement is that the Nuremberg connection
to Wechsler's advocacy of neutral principles arose from the troubling
question of "victor's justice" raised by the trials and not from the fact
that Wechsler in Nuremberg had come face-to-face with the brutality
of the Nazi state.
Having said that, Wechsler's adoption of the abstract category of
"neutrality" - as well as the legal process school's more general
319. According to Peller, Dewey felt that "value-relativism did not lead to condoning the
fascists." Peller, supra note 24, at 583.
320. See id. at 583-84.
321. Primus does not refer specifically to "anti-foundationalism" but I have chosen to do
so to underline the fact that we can identify either end of the foundational/anti-foundational
spectrum as a response to totalitarianism. That, of course, does not mean that Primus is wrong
in his identification of specific cases, but this case-by-case method makes it too easy to slot any
legal writing in one of these two categories.
322. Primus, supra note 25, at 427.
323. Id. at 433 n.68.
324. See Norman Sibler & Geoffrey Mviller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law:
Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854 (1993).
325. Id. at 930.
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move from substance to procedure-may very well have been
motivated by a revulsion against the dogmatic nature of
totalitarianism. As mentioned above, Dewey responded to that
dogmatism by maintaining what Peller described as an "open-ended
method," and in light of Dewey's immense stature well into the
1950s, it should not be surprising that his views would be shared by
"the mainstream fifties thinkers. 3 26 Indeed, Wechsler may have
crafted his "neutral principles" in Dewey's wake. Unfortunately,
there is little in Toward Neutral Principles that explicitly suggests a
fear of the ideological. Rather, there are concerns that a court case
might "turn on the immediate result, 3 27 that is, a judgment might be
driven by a single constituency. What Wechsler feared was the court
functioning "as a naked power organ."" But fearing an overly
political court seems a long way away from a fear of totalitarianism.
If Wechsler spoke of "danger," it was only in the context of the
"danger of the imputation of a bias favoring claims of one kind or
another.3 29 There was no threat of uncontrollable mobs or of
governmental brutality, just courts drifting too far into politics and a
Brown Court that based its decision on the wrong reasoning.3
E. James Willard Hurst and the Conditioning of Freedom
In 1956 Willard Hurst published a short reading list of "Social
Science on a Lawyer's Bookshelf" for the Wisconsin Bar.33 The list is
a wonderfully faithful rendition of the core thematics of history and
social science of the 1950s. It begins with "Political history" split
between "The event as laboratory instance," including Perry Miller
and C. Vann Woodward's Reunion and Reaction, and "Ideas and
environment: the importance of the commonplace" listing three
volumes by Richard Hofstadter (among them the recently published
The Age of Reform and The American Political Tradition), Henry
Nash Smith's Virgin Land, Vernon Parrington, and, of course,
326. Peller, supra note 24, at 583.
327. Wechsler, supra note 221, at 17.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 14.
330. "The problem inheres strictly in the reasoning of the opinion, an opinion which is
often read with less fidelity by those who praise it than by those by whom it is condemned." Id.
at 44.
331. A version of this bibliographical list appears (with checks marked by Felix
Frankfurter as to the books he had read) in the Felix Frankfurter Papers at the Library of
Congress, reel 42 (May 10, 1956). Daniel Ernst drew my attention to this revealing document. I
have provided an in-depth analysis of the intellectual force fields acting on Willard Hurst's
Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States, including Hurst's
engagement and debate with the titles in his book list for the Wisconsin Bar, in Carl Landauer,
Social Science on a Lawyer's Bookshelf: Willard Hurst's Law and the Conditions of Freedom in
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Charles Beard. The next section of the list-reflecting the associated
vogues for anthropology, psychology, and sociology-appears under
the title "Anthropology, Social Psychology, Sociology: cf. Social
History" and includes Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture and
Abraham Kardiner's The Psychological Frontiers of Society before
turning to a subsection on "National character" that includes Oscar
Handlin's The Uprooted a few titles up from David Riesman's The
Lonely Crowd. The third and longest section of the list, devoted to
the "The politics of the economy," includes Berle and Means's The
Modern Corporation, Peter Drucker's Concept of the Corporation,
and Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, as well as books by
Louis Hartz, Joseph Dorfman, and John Kenneth Galbraith. In
short, Willard Hurst's suggestions for the lawyer's social science
bookshelf are evocative of the history and social science tastes of the
mid-1950s, and it is hardly surprising to discover the close parallel
between the reading list and the endnotes to Hurst's Law and the
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States.
As mentioned earlier, the second endnote of Law and the
Conditions of Freedom supports the point that the "release-of-
energy faith demonstrated in our law expressed one aspect of a social
value scale which measured men by their accomplishment in striving
toward self-appointed material goals rather than by their status" by
citing Karen Horney's The Neurotic Personality of Our Time and
Margaret Mead's And Keep Your Powder Dry.332 With this obvious
tie to the main currents of social science writing, we confront the
question whether Hurst replicated the totalitarian anxieties of that
writing or the psychopathological diagnosis of American society.
Hurst begins his slim volume with the famous discussion of the
Pike Creek squatters' "constitution." In 1836 these Wisconsin
squatters-"put less sympathetically, they were trespassers""-
illegally occupied land on the southeastern shore of Lake Michigan
before the federal survey was complete so they could take possession
of the land, having lawfully created a "Claimants' Union" to defend
their position. For Willard Hurst, this episode in frontier history
replaces the myth of "frontier justice" with a window onto the
"working legal philosophy of our nineteenth-century ancestors."3 '
This begins Hurst's discussion of the main aim of early nineteenth-
century law as an effort to create the conditions for the "release of
332. HURST, supra note 64, at 109, 109 n.2 (citing KAREN HORNEY, THE NEUROTIC
PERSONALITY OF OUR TIME (1937); MARGARET MEAD, AND KEEP YOUR POWDER DRY:
AN ANTHROPOLOGIST LOOKS AT AMERICA (1942)).
333. Id. at 3.
334. Id. at 3.
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creative human energy.""33 The opening pages are drawn with such
sympathy for the "trespassers" that it is clear that Hurst does not see
anything dangerous in their association. Despite the presence of
Richard Hofstadter in his endnotes and on his reading list, Hurst
does not find the pathological element in the claimant association of
Pikes Creek.
Hurst's book traverses the nineteenth century and enters the
twentieth century with an occasional reference to the New Deal and
the 1950s, and one can expect that the romantic flair with which he
opened his book will soon dissipate, that he will move away from a
romanticism about the frontier emphasis on human creativity and
toward a more somber mood as his America industrializes in the
mid- and late-nineteenth century. Indeed, the very market-oriented
community that encouraged the "release of creative energies" had its
social costs.336  Hurst described the dislocations brought by
urbanization and industrialization. He observed that "great
expectations made frustration the more bitter." '337 "The people of the
new metropolis," he wrote, "found their disappointment hardest to
express, for they lacked a justifying tradition of urban protest."338 In
addition to the "bewildered anger and searching of jobless native
workers" in the cities, Hurst describes the farmers as "bewildered
and angry as they struggled in the market net." '339 But if Hurst speaks
of "unaccustomed thrusts of desire and fear in society"' and turns in
his discussion of protest movements like the Farmers' Alliance, the
Grange, and the Knights of Labor to the anthropologist Ralph
Linton for his observations on group psychology, he talks about the
members of these protest movements "using law positively."'" Right
after quoting Linton's The Cultural Background of Personality at
length, Hurst writes: "But law was also part of the frame of reference
in this society and culture-in the form of the centuries-old Western
tradition of constitutionalism." 2 It seems that neither the Wisconsin
squatters nor those dislocated at the end of the nineteenth century
ventured far from the legalistic traditions of the country: The law is
335. Id. at 5.
336. Here Hurst's debt to Karl Polanyi's THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) was
critical. For Hurst's acknowledgment of his debt to Polanyi, see Aviamn Soifer, In Retrospect:
Willard Hurst, Consensus History, and the Growth of American Law, 20 REv. AM. HIST. 125,
141 n.12 (1992), and for a comparison of Hurst's view of the market and Polanyi's, see
Landauer, supra note 331, at 82-85.
337. HURST, supra note 64, at 73.
338. Id. at 74.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 85.
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always framed to provide the "conditions of freedom."
Robert Gordon has described Hurst as "an intensely committed
moralist, for whom the past is full of dreadful warnings."" But Law
and the Conditions of Freedom does not seem so full of warning.
Even at the height of struggle, the viewpoints were not so disparate.
Describing the period of rapid change from roughly 1870 to 1910,
Hurst observes that "[i]nterest group conflict in plenty marked the
statute books and judicial opinions. '"3' However, "the hard pressed
positions and the angry tones among the major interests continued to
be those of dispute within the family of middle-class values which
had set the dominant policy tone of our society from our
constitution-making generation on."3" Similarly, Hurst writes that
"[a] good deal of flamboyant talk of 'class' conflict colored the
oratory of farm revolt in the nineties" and then counters: "But the
morale of agrarian politics really rested on the continued
Jeffersonian vision of a middle-class society of independent
yeomen."'346
Hurst advances beyond the Hartzian vision of a narrowly middle-
class society to suggest that change itself may have contributed to
absence of class conflict:
Probably the pace of change after 1870 did as much as anything
else to brake the development of a broad and lasting
consciousness of class division. Events so hurried us from one
society into another that we were living in a new order, with our
old frames of reference, before we began fully to realize what
had happened. 7
The resulting ethos of late nineteenth-century change was a shift
toward a "more rational calculus in the total economy."'3 Here
Hurst describes an America finally moving after its inability to
understand the social costs of its economic progress "toward a
concept of social cost accounting."" 9 Rather than violence and crowd
psychology, Hurst describes a shift toward a Progressive agenda-
the growth of public health, labor law, and consumer protection.
If there is little violence in Hurst's narrative, there are important
parts of the story that are hardly positive:
Whether the record was of premature depletion of energy
343. Robert Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in
American Legal Historiography, 10 L. & Soc'Y REv. 9,48 (1975).
344. HURST, supra note 64, at 94.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 95.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 96.
349. Id.
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sources (as in fruitless burning off of natural gas or improper
drilling for oil), the pollution of water supply and destruction of
fish life (through dumping of mineral or industrial cast-offs), the
exhaustion of game (by reckless commercial hunting of pigeons,
geese, or buffalo, for example), or soil erosion or air pollution,
the story of nineteenth-century public policy ran the same
course. First we wasted natural resources because we could not
see their use or because they were in the way of some immediate
goal. Next our expanding markets would suddenly produce a
rush and a scale of demand which encouraged headlong,
unplanned profit taking.5°
This passage provides a preview of Hurst's later work on the
lumber industry in Wisconsin.. and its depiction of the inability of
Wisconsin's legal regime to prevent the industry's self-destruction.52
This paragraph and Hurst's later book on lumber are tales of a failed
system, but even in Hurst's most somber mood, we are far from the
totalitarian fears of other historians and social scientists. Hurst may
have identified some of the costs of the economic and political values
of a growing America, but those costs do not suggest the nightmarish
potential of a totalitarian state.
In his essay on Willard Hurst, Robert Gordon claims that the
"great strength that his historical work derives from his pragmatist's
vision is the outsider's perspective." '353 But the voice of Law and the
Conditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States was
hardly that of the outsider. One of the interesting elements in
Hurst's mode of writing is that throughout the book he uses the first-
person plural over and over again. Hurst writes that "we had begun
our national history,' 354 "we used law, '355 "we pressed," '356 "[w]e were
willing to incur, '' 357 "we learned to regard," '358 "[w]e confronted, 359
and "[w]e had to learn.' '3' This list is just a small sample. Clearly,
Hurst's is a narrative that creates little distance between author and
subject. Hurst makes the American past his past-he seems to be
there, using, pressing, learning, confronting, and so forth. In his
famous critique of Vernon Parrington in The Liberal Imagination,
350. Id. at 99.
351. J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE
LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836-1915 (1964).
352. On Hurst's lumber book, see Gordon, supra note 343, at 50-52.
353. Id. at 50.
354. HURST, supra note 64, at 95.
355. Id. at 53.
356. Id. at 67.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 35.
359. Id.
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Lionel Trilling observes:
Parrington's characteristic weakness as a historian is suggested
by his title, for the culture of a nation is not truly figured in the
image of the current. A culture is not a flow, nor even a
confluence; the form of its existence is struggle, or at least
debate-it is nothing if not a dialectic.361
With all of Willard Hurst's first-person plural references, Trilling's
complaint may well be equally applicable to Willard Hurst's Law
and the Conditions of Freedom.
F. Edmond Cahn's Moral Constitution
In 1955, New York University law teacher Edmund Cahn
published The Moral Decision,362 which ranged in subject matter
from the moral issues of marriage relations to constitutional issues of
due process, and Cahn drew from Kant and Kierkegaard, Plato and
Charles Sanders Peirce, Thoreau and the Talmud for his analysis. It
is clear that we have entered the realm of a moral philosopher, and
from the first page of his first chapter on "Morals as a Legal Order,"
Cahn attacks the "moral confusion in our times." '363 He makes clear
that the confusion was a result of the move that Edward Purcell
ascribes to non-Euclideanism,36 whether in the form of historical
anthropology or the promotion of semantics by Charles Ogden and
I.A. Richards:
Probably not since the days when the Sophists carried their
skepticism from city to city in ancient Greece have men been so
afflicted with uncertainty. Dazzling economic and social
transformations, the popularization of scientific method and the
cynicism bred of world wars, the observation of foreign societies
and exotic customs, the growth of relativism and hedonism in
philosophy, and the development of sophisticated semantics-all
have challenged the established landmarks and eradicated the
familiar lines between the moral and the immoral.365
Indeed, Cahn seems to have summoned much of the same catalog
of the sources of relativism that appears in Purcell's study. In a list
that includes Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, Henry Hart, and
Lon Fuller, Eugene Rostow identifies Edmund Cahn in 1962 as one
of the scholars whose "work has helped to correct and offset the
361. LIONEL TRILLING, THE LIBERAL IMAGINATION: ESSAYS ON LITERATURE AND
SOCIETY 9 (Scribner's 1976) (1950).
362. EDMUND CAHN, THE MORAL DECISION: RIGHT AND WRONG IN THE LIGHT OF
AMERICAN LAW (New Midland Book ed., Indiana Univ. Press 1981) (1955).
363. Id. at 9.
364. See PURCELL, supra note 9, at 47-73.
365. CAHN, supra note 362, at 9.
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relative neglect of the problem of values which characterized the
more positivistic outlook of the earlier legal realists."3" As Rostow
suggests in his footnote: "This theme in the American literature
corresponds to a worldwide revival of interest in the problem of
standards for law, stimulated by the problem of law under
circumstances of fascist and communist dictatorship." '367 Cahn writes
of "sickening and panicky doubts""' about the moral order-
combining the terror and nausea of Kierkegaard and Sartre-but the
question remains whether his reassertion of moral thinking and
suggestion of a "moral habit"' 9 clearly refer to the totalitarian
challenge.
Cahn's approach to discussing the relationship of law and morality
is to embrace complexity. He describes skepticism and naturalism as
"two massive roadblocks standing in our way.""37 He tells us that
pure naturalism "need not delay us long, for the history of continual
mutations in its so-called 'immutables' is too familiar."37' Similarly,
morals are not merely mores for Cahn: "That, of course, is the
reason why we are capable of passing moral judgments on what we
believe to be accepted and customary social practices."3"' In fact, like
other legal thinkers of the 1950s, Cahn was quite aware that the
question of law and morality was rife with antinomies. "American
attitudes toward the law from our national beginnings down to the
present day," Cahn tells us, "make up a history of fierce and
unresolved tension." '373 He describes a sort of schizophrenia
regarding the law: "On the one side, there has been an uncritical and
excessive trust in what can be accomplished through legislation and
policing, while, on the other side, there has been an equally
unwarranted mistrust of the law and of social control by means of
government." '74 And finally he describes as "entirely right" a
''pragmatic position" that "acknowledges the active existence of
moral values along with other, non-moral elements in the law." He
also endorses an understanding that "while some moral precepts are
enforced by the courts, others are not, and that only conventions and
customs of the times determine whether to enforce a precept here or
366. EUGENE V. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE QUEST FOR LAW 21 (1962). Rostow also lists Felix Cohen, F.S.C. Northrop, Friedrich
Kessler, and Jerome Hall. See id.
367. Id. at 21 n.26.
368. CAHN, supra note 362, at 10.
369. Id. at 23.
370. Id. at 25.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 26.
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remit it there."375 In working out these ideas, Cahn may have used
unmodulated positions as foils, but he did not introduce communism
or fascism into his moral narrative.
The core of Cahn's book consists of episodic analyses, each
starting with a short description of a case. In his introduction, Cahn
writes: "As we draw on the law's experience, we shall deal with the
homely concerns of human existence from birth and the beginning,
through the entire cycle of growth, love and ambition, desire and
anxiety, until we come to death and the end." '376 Cahn narrates little
episodes of annulled marriages, commercial fraud, and a banker who
could be liable for maliciously setting up a competing barber shop to
run a man he despised out of business. But among these exotic tales
of day-to-day life, Cahn introduces several politically charged
narratives. These include the Supreme Court's decisions in the two
related Jehovah's Witnesses cases377 and in Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad Co.,37 where the Court held that Bester William
Steele, an African-American fireman, could enjoin the all-white
Brotherhood of Firemen from replacing him with a more junior
white member of the union.379 But not even these politically charged
cases raise the threat of the totalitarian state. In Cahn's discussion of
the Steele case, Cahn asserts that "an official act of bigotry implicates
every adult member of the political community."3" He then
hypothesizes that "[i]f we lived under a despotic form of
government, we might be able to escape this burden of vicarious
involvement."381 In essence, the despotic state only appears in Cahn's
book in a counterfactual hypothesis, not even embodied as the
Soviet or Nazi state.
G. Myres McDougal's Policy-Oriented Cold War
Neil Duxbury has described the policy-oriented international legal
work of Myres McDougal as a "cloak for Cold War chauvinism."' If
one looks at the twelve, mostly co-authored articles that were
collected in the one-thousand-plus-page Studies in World Public
Order in 1960,' it is unquestionable that McDougal and his
375. Id. at 47.
376. Id. at 5.
377. See id. at 175-76 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Tucker v. Texas, 326
U.S. 517 (1946)).
378. See id. at 154-55 (citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 768
(1952)).
379. See id.
380. Id. at 163.
381. Id.
382. NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 197 (1995).
383. STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (Myres S. McDougal et al. eds., 1960).
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associates were fighting the Cold War in print. That is particularly
apparent in the essay, The Veto and the Charter, a brief in response
to the Soviet claim that its absence during the Security Council vote
on the North Korean invasion of the South should have negated the
vote.38 Similarly, the essay justifying under international law the U.S.
hydrogen bomb tests conducted in the Marshall Islands is an
unalloyed piece of Cold War advocacy.'
Over and over again in the various articles that comprise the
Studies in World Public Order, McDougal and his various associates
describe human dignity as the key value for international law and
make it patently clear that it is a value the Soviets and the Chinese
do not share. McDougal's 1959 essay, Perspectives for an
International Law of Human Dignity, forcefully states that
[t]he overriding struggle for most comprehensive completion is,
of course, between totalitarian orders, which explicitly demand
the employment of force as an instrument of expansion and
postulate the monopolization rather than wide sharing of many
important values, and the nontotalitarian orders, with a
dominant democratic core, which authorize the use of force only
for conservation of values in freedom, safety, and abundance."
He writes of the "unprecedented stakes in this struggle" and of
"unprecedented peril." Yet despite the peril and the struggle,
McDougal's prose is suffused with confidence, and somewhat
surprisingly, it seems to be a confidence about the role of the scholar
and of theory.
McDougal explains:
The task which I have set myself is to consider as systemically as
possible what those of us who are genuinely committed to the
values of human dignity may do, in our specialized roles as
scholars, advocates, counselors, negotiators, and decision-
makers, to establish and maintain the perspectives best
described to help move mankind from its present precarious
balance of terror toward a more complete world public order-
toward an integrative universalism-in which the values of
human diginity may be fulfilled and made more secure."
384. Myres S. McDougal & Richard N. Gardner, The Veto and the Charter: An
Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258 (1951), reprinted in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, supra note 383, at 718.
385. See Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests in
Perspective: Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955), reprinted in STUDIES IN
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra note 383, at 763.
386. Myres S. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity,
PROCEEDINGS, A.S.I.L. 107 (1959), reprinted in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, supra
note 383, at 987.
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Emphasizing the place of theory, McDougal writes:
I will rather simply recommend the continuous employment, in
our specialized roles, of a certain process of thought -a frame of
reference, a method of inquiry, a disciplined and contextual
mode of analysis-intended to promote the most effective use of
our minds in bringing to bear upon inquiry and specific choice
the most relevant findings and techniques of contemporary
science and technology.'
It is clear that for McDougal, international politics was amenable to
policy science.
As I have emphasized, McDougal is forthright about his Cold War
message, but it is interesting how over the one thousand pages of the
Studies in World Public Order, the overall message is not so much
about a confrontation with totalitarian regimes as it is about the
science of creating a worthy world public order. McDougal's 1952
essay, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order,389
announces its politics in its title. However, despite the various
footnotes to anthropologists like Bronislaw Malinowski and
Margaret Mead and other social scientists like Charles Merriam,
Talcott Parsons, and Abram Kardiner, he uses these references to
address value shaping and value analysis. And despite a reference to
"myth" following a citation to Franz Neumann, whose Behemoth
provided a social-economic analysis of the Nazi state,3" McDougal's
social science did not share the psychopathology so prevalent among
American social scientists.391
McDougal in an essay coauthored with Harold Lasswell ends with
a reference to "'our time of trouble' and 'age of anxiety."' 3  The
challenge is there, even if the references are in quotation marks that
hedge how much McDougal and Lasswell think of it as truly a time
of trouble and an age of anxiety:
As a contemporary step in the direction of such universality it is
imperative that spokesmen for the field of international law
cease proclaiming the present universality of international law
and drop the assumption that it is a matter of indifference what
388. Id. at 990.
389. Myres S. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 1 AM. J. COMP. L. 24 (1957),
reprinted in STUDIES IN WORLD ORDER, supra note 383, at 947.
390. FRANZ NEUMANN, BEHEMOTH: THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE OF NATIONAL
SOCIALISM, 1933-1944 (rev. ed. 1944) (1942).
391. See McDougal, supra note 389, at 958 n.30, 959.
392. Myres S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 A.J.I.L. 1 (1959), reprinted in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER, supra note 383, at 3, 41.
232
62
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol12/iss2/1
Landauer
system of public order achieves universality. This is the
challenging opportunity that "our time of trouble" and "age of
anxiety" offers to all scholars everywhere.393
Because I am attempting to set legal writers apart from social and
political science writers, it would, of course, be instructive to
compare McDougal with his main collaborator, Harold Lasswell, the
political scientist McDougal enticed from the University of Chicago
to team-teach courses at the Yale Law School. Lasswell had written
books in the 1920s and 1930s with titles like Propaganda Technique
in the World War, Psychopathology and Politics, and World Politics
and Personal Insecurity.3" Indeed, his World Politics and Personal
Insecurity ends its final chapter, "In Quest of Myth," by observing
resignedly: "Clearly, insofar as politics is the management of symbols
and practices related to the shape and composition of the value
patterns of society, politics can assume no static certainty; it can
strive for dynamic techniques of navigating the tides of insecurity
generated within the nature of man in culture."395 There is a level at
which Lasswell retains some of the imprint of the social science
anxiety that I have described more broadly. Despite the hyper-
taxonomical language of Power and Society, which Lasswell
published with political philosopher Abraham Kaplan in 1950,"9
there is a much greater sense of continuity between liberal and
oppressive societies than in any of the essays in Studies in World
Public Order. On the other hand, it is also true that Lasswell felt that
social theory during the interwar period had failed in its policy-
forming role.3" And it is interesting to note that as McDougal grew
in stature and confidence, their team-taught course, which was
originally entitled "Property in a Crisis Society," evolved into the
Yale staple, "Law, Science and Policy." '398
This Article is not the place to work out the varying contributions
and attitudes of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, but what is
particularly important for my argument is their shared effort to train
lawyers as policy practitioners, starting with their manifesto in the
Yale Law Journal in 1943 entitled Legal Education and Public
393. Id. at 40-41.
394. LASSWELL, supra note 89; HAROLD D. LASSWELL, PSYCHOPATHOLOGY AND
POLITICS (1930); LASSWELL, supra note 95.
395. LASSWELL, supra note 95, at 285.
396. HAROLD D. LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A
FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL INQUIRY (1950).
397. See Harold D. Lasswell, The Relation of Ideological Intelligence to Public Policy, 53
ETHICS 25 (1942), cited in DUXBURY, supra note 382, at 168.
398. See Andrew R. Willard, Myres Smith McDougal: A Life of and About Human Dignity,
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Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest.3" Neil Duxbury
chronicles the Harvard alarm at Lasswell and McDougal's proposals
as an attack on the Langdellian tradition so dear to those in
Cambridge, but Duxbury notes that W. Barton Leach's "own views
regarding the future development of legal education were not all that
far removed from those of Lasswell and McDougal."' In a very
important sense, McDougal's international law-despite its Cold
War content -expresses the same confidence in the proactive role of
government in the international scene as he talks of a "World Public
Order," as well as a confidence in the lawyer's deep attachment to
this order.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE TWO CULTURES
My analysis of a selection of major legal writings from the postwar
period has suggested that the psychopathology of mass culture and
mass society, as well as the pressing fear of totalitarianism -both so
prominent in the social and political science writing of the postwar
period-did not seem to command the same obsessive power in legal
writing. What I would like to argue is that totalitarianism was not
stage-front in postwar legal writing, not so much because it possessed
power in absence but rather because the anxieties expressed by the
social and political sciences simply were not shared by legal writers. I
will suggest several reasons for this divergence-part of it based in
biographical differences, such as the number of 6migr6 scholars in
social and political science and the greater extent of the
administrative agency experience of law professors. But ultimately,
the lack of palpable anxiety speaks to a confidence in government
that derives from the core institutional culture of the legal academy.
I am referring here not just to the culture of the postwar period,
but rather to a culture or intellectual style that has tremendous
resilience and sharply separates law from other disciplines. At the
end of this Article I turn to Laura Kalman's discussion of "legal
liberalism's" faith in the courts and suggest that it has wider
application than Kalman suggests. I will then turn to Duncan
Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication as exemplary of this
intellectual style. Some of Kennedy's critics have always seen the
Harvard Law School professor as the ultimate insider; I would like to
describe his "internal critique" of the law as finally more internal
than critical-and Kennedy's book underscores the point that,
interdisciplinary infusions aside, legal academics are set apart in their
399. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
400. DUXBURY, supra note 382, at 189.
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Throughout the twentieth century there has been a great deal of
cross-pollination not just among the American legal realists and the
contemporary "law and" movements. It was, for example, absolutely
typical of Felix Frankfurter that he wrote a foreword to the
published proceedings of the 1949 University of Wisconsin
conference on regionalism in America edited by the historian Merrill
Jensen."° And we should remember that both Daniel Boorstin and
David Riesman were trained as lawyers, and there was a range of
faculty cross-listings between law schools and social science
departments, as with Lasswell and Hurst. Nevertheless, despite the
cross-pollination and the cross-listing, legal thought has maintained a
separate intellectual style throughout.
A. The Gregarious Crowd
I have named Robert Jackson's The Supreme Court in the
American System of Government as one of the few exceptions where
preoccupation with the totalitarian threat came to the fore in legal
writing. But even Jackson's book, which began with a confrontation
with communism, Nazism, and fascism and ended by discussing the
maintenance of a "system of free political government,"' spent most
of its pages far afield from the threat of totalitarianism. Jackson's
discussion of oil and gas law and his passages on the Tenth
Amendment have little to do with a totalitarian threat to the
democratic state.
A number of scholars, including Morton Horwitz, Laura Kalman,
Gary Peller, Edward Purcell, and Richard Primus, have located one
of the key sources of the legal writing of the 1950s in its
confrontation with totalitarianism. Rather than suggesting that the
confrontation with totalitarianism fell short of being a formative
experience for the legal writers of the 1950s, I have argued that the
legal writing of the 1950s lacked the expressive fear of totalitarianism
so prevalent in social and political science writing. Rarely in the legal
writing of the postwar period did one confront the anxiety about the
totalitarian potential of modern society and the portrait of a
pathological mass culture found in social and political science
writing.
As I have suggested, many of the postwar jurisprudential
developments -such as the turn to process and the rush to standards,
whether as renewed morality or procedural focus (e.g., Wechsler's
401. Felix A. Frankfurter, Foreword to REGIONALISM IN AMERICA at xv (Merrill Jensen
ed., 1965) (1951).
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neutrality)-may very well have developed as responses to
totalitarianism. When Eugene Rostow in 1962 identified the turn to
standards as a response to communism and fascism in anticipation of
Edward Purcell's The Crisis of Democratic Theory,' 3 he probably
correctly identified the importance of totalitarianism in that
development. Although the jurisprudential climate of the 1950s is
traceable to a confrontation with totalitarianism, it is significant that
one has to go through the act of tracing because the totalitarian
threat is not foregrounded to the degree it is in the social and
political science writing of the same period.
With our present commitment to the hermeneutic turn, one might
ask why I should put an emphasis on the explicitness of
totalitarianism anxieties. Certainly, there are many theories that find
presence in absence and that privilege the unstated. One might turn
to Anna Freud's identification of "denial" as one of the basic defense
mechanisms of the ego' and find in the absence of expressed anxiety
its opposite. In essence, the ego has learned to defend itself by not
pronouncing the source of its own anxiety. One might make the
more mundane observation that the unstated is often too obvious to
state-because everyone was so completely aware of the power of
totalitarian anxiety, there was little need to identify its presence.
And, finally, there are several versions of the hermeneutic turn
whereby absence implies presence, and meaning may be decoded
from that very absence. All of that may be true, and in general,
silences in legal writing often bear witness. Nevertheless, those
interpretations fail to explain the differences between social science
and legal writing; they do not explain why social and political science
writing is so much more deeply emotive in its response to
totalitarianism than is the legal writing of the postwar period. That
emotive element is a presence that must be accounted for.
One of the telling differences between postwar social science
departments on the one hand and the law schools (and the bench) on
the other was the significant presence of refugee scholars in the
former. The Intellectual Migration, edited by Donald Fleming and
Bernard Bailyn, includes chapters on the refugee scholars in
psychology, literary criticism, and art history and chapters on
individual members of the Frankfurt School, but no discussion of
refugee legal scholars."5 Numerous refugees trained as lawyers in
Europe were unable to use their legal training directly in the United
403. See ROSTOW, supra note 366, at 21 n.26 (1962).
404. See ANNA FREUD, EGO AND THE MECHANISMS OF DEFENSE (1937).
405. THE INTELLECTUAL MIGRATION: EUROPE AND AMERICA, 1930-1960 (Donald
Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1969).
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States and turned to the humanities and social sciences-one thinks,
for example, of Arnold Brecht, Otto Kirchheimer, and, of course,
Franz Neumann, whose Behemoth was one of the centerpieces of the
analysis of totalitarianism.' The story of the refugee scholars at the
New School for Social Research is quite suggestive of the importance
of totalitarianism within the social sciences and the humanities.'
This is certainly part of the explanation, and, as mentioned above,
Wilfred McClay's chapter on the confrontation with totalitarianism
in his study of individualism and community in the culture of modern
America is subtitled "The Mind in Exile" and places enormous
emphasis on the impact of 6migr6 writers like Arendt and Fromm-
unfortunately without explaining why their views of totalitarianism
and mass society resonated in the American academy.'
Instead of focusing on the peculiarities of the social and political
science writers of the postwar period, I would like to turn to the
institutional culture of the law school and discuss what I have earlier
called its paired worldly and otherworldly pull away from concerns
about the totalitarian state. By worldly, I mean quite concretely the
worldly experience of the lawyers in the administrative state, and by
otherworldly, the self-absorption of the judicial function of the law
with its sacral representations.
Just as the impact of the refugee scholar on the social sciences
colored the social scientific values of the postwar period, so too did
the New Deal experience of the judge and the law professor have an
impact on how the role of government, and deviation from its correct
functioning, were viewed. If a number of significant historians, as
well as the psychoanalysts of the Frankfurt School, spent the war in
the Research and Analysis Department of the Office of Strategic
Services analyzing and combating the Nazi state,'  many lawyers
406. On this point it is telling that James Herget's chapter "The Migrant Scholars, 1940-
1970" focuses on Edgar Bodenheimer, Friedrich August von Hayek, Hans Kelsen, and Otto
Kirchheimer. Bodenheimer taught at the University of Utah Law School and Kirchheimer was
cross-listed at the Columbia Law School. Herget notes at the end of a footnote on
Kirchheimer's writings: "Most of his English-language materials appeared in political science
periodicals." JAMES E. HERGET, AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, 1870-1970: A HISTORY 282
n.42 (1990).
407. See CLAus-DIETER KROHN, INTELLECrUALS IN EXILE: REFUGEE SCHOLARS AND
THE NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Univ. of
Massachusetts Press 1993). One is reminded of the work directly on the subject of
totalitarianism by Emil Lederer, Max Ascoli, Arthur Feiler, Eduard Heimann, and, most
significantly, Hannah Arendt. It is McClay's contention that the dmigr6 scholars were at the
epicenter of the interpretation of American society through the prism of totalitarianism. See
MCCLAY, supra note 102, at 189-225.
408. See MCCLAY, supra note 102, at 189-225.
409. Barry KItz provides an excellent analysis of the role of historians and other social
scientists in the Office of Strategic Services as well as its impact on the postwar development of
the social sciences. See BARRY M. KATZ, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: RESEARCH AND
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who would later find themselves on law school faculties and on the
bench cut their teeth in jobs at the various alphabet soup agencies of
the New Deal. Charles Wyzanski had been Solicitor for the
Department of Labor, and Paul Freund held posts at the
Department of the Treasury and the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. Similarly, Herbert Wechsler held several positions in
the federal government, as did Henry Hart, including a stint in the
Office of Price Administration. Indeed, to this last point, Eskridge
and Frickey have provided a list of the future law professors who
worked as lawyers in the OPA.410 Edmund Cahn held a position as
Corporation Counsel for the City of New York. And during the war,
Myres McDougal was Assistant General Counsel in the Lend-Lease
Administration and General Counsel in the Office of Foreign Relief
and Rehabilitation Operations.11 This is not to say that there were
not social scientists, especially economists like John Kenneth
Galbraith, recruited by the new administrative agencies; indeed,
social scientists, like Hofstadter, often saw themselves as political
experts.412 But the presence of lawyers in the New Deal was greater
and the assumed proximity to government that much clearer. In
large part, the New Deal lawyers who worked in the administrative
state retained a residual commitment to it. It was, consequently, less
likely that they would voice serious criticism of the goals and
processes of government. To this point, Hart and Sacks's The Legal
Process represents, fundamentally, a celebration of the affirmative
role and functioning of the administrative state in the voice of
administrative insiders.
In 1948, Joseph Rosenfarb, who had worked for the National
Labor Relations Board, published a book tellingly entitled Freedom
and the Administrative State.1 3 Significantly, Rosenfarb's final
chapter was devoted to the topic of "Freedom through
Government." We have already seen that one of the themes in
postwar legal writing was the affirmative role of government and its
contribution to the conditions of freedom. We should understand,
then, that the New Deal experience with its concomitant confidence
in the affirmative role of the administrative state and in the efficacy
of democratic institutions encouraged a confident view of
government and society in postwar legal writing.
On the other side of the worldly/otherworldly pairing of the bench
asserts that "by far the most significant wartime occupation for historians was intelligence
analysis for the Office of Strategic Services." NOVICK, supra note 42, at 302.
410. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 257, at lxxviii.
411. See Willard, supra note 398, at 930.
412. See MORTON, supra note 36, at 121.
413. JOSEPH ROSENFARB, FREEDOM AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1948).
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and the law school was the historic self-absorption of the courts and
the judicial function. Learned Hand's priestly self-imaging is just one
part of the Frankfurter-Hand-Wechsler sacralization of the judiciary.
As much as legal scholars participated in the legal realist
desacralization of the formalist judiciary, they participated in a
resacralization of the judicial function. Wechsler's "neutral
principles" and Fuller's "inner morality" represented attempts in the
post-legal realist environment to redefine the act of judging as
sacred. Admittedly, the law evolves with society; there can be no
eternal truths. And yet, Wechsler and Fuller, along with other legal
process thinkers, moved from substance to process to identify their
truths.
The preoccupation with the role of the courts- especially the old
liberal worries of Frankfurter, Hand, and Wechsler about the abuse
of the judicial function-has little to say about the threat of
totalitarianism.41 ' Fuller and others may have talked about the role of
a positivist jurisprudence in the rise of Nazism, but in the end it is
difficult to identify the judiciary, even at its most abusive, as a real
totalitarian threat. If this otherworldliness might occasionally
coincide with a poignant quote from Walter Lippmann about the
"public philosophy," in the final analysis it represented a very
different sort of threat than the threats that permeated much of
postwar social and political science writing.
If we are, indeed, able to locate the sociological and ideological
sources of these differences in emphasis on the totalitarian threat
between social science writing and legal writing, these differences
were formative for the later criticism leveled against both groups. It
should, for example, be expected that the critics of the postwar social
and political science writers would see their totalitarian angst in Cold
War terms and overemphasize the "consensus" in the consensus
historians. Similarly, the resacralization of the judicial function of the
otherworldly side of 1950s legal writing invited Gary Peller's
"Neutral Principles" critique while the worldly side invited a critique
of the legal system as dysfunctional.
B. The Strange Career of Legal Thought
If the patterns of postwar legal thought framed the critique that
followed them, there is nevertheless a great deal of continuity
between postwar legal thought and legal thought of the following
decades. In the end, postwar and postmodern legal thought may not
414. Here one can think as well of Yale Law School Dean Fred Rodell's Nine Men, which
was an all-out attack on the Court throughout its history for a wide variety of sins. See FRED
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be so dissimilar. In order to make this argument, I would like to use
Laura Kalman's The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism as a point of
departure. I would like to extend some of her observations about
"legal liberalism" in the law faculty beyond the aims of her book, to
suggest more broadly some enduring traits of legal writing that she
has identified as legal liberalism.
At the beginning of her book, Kalman states that she uses
the term legal liberalism to refer to trust in the potential of
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about "those
specific social reforms that affect large groups of people such as
blacks, or workers, or women, or partisans of a particular
persuasion; in other words, policy change with nationwide
impact.415
Her book is a tale of legal liberalism's "strange career," in part its
staying power-or, as she puts it, "how law professors have kept the
faith in what has been called 'the cult of the Court,' defined here as
confidence in the ability of courts to change society for what judges
believe is the better.
'416
After discussing the evolution of the legal process school, Kalman
sets off the process thinkers, with their focus on process and
neutrality, and the proponents of the judicial activism reflected in the
decisions of the Warren Court. For her, it is clear that they reside
within the same tradition: "In the 1960s," she tells us, "two groups of
law professors bickered, but theirs was a family quarrel between
Warren Court activists and process theorists, two wings of the realist
tradition. 4 17 In Kalman's narrative, the developments of the 1960s
and the boldness of the Warren Court provided the perfect backdrop
for legal liberalism in the law schools. 41 "The Warren Court,"
Kalman asserts, "made the 1960s a good time for the law schools. All
aspects of society-even corporate law firms-seemed viable
candidates for reform. 4 19 Indeed, in line with what I have described
as the worldly aspect of legal writing, Kalman tells us that "[1]aw
professors 'moved easily between the practical and academic worlds.'
Through their students and their scholarship, they could even believe
they ran the world. '42' There was, it seemed, no question about the
415. KALMAN, supra note 23, at 2 (quoting GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 4 (1991) (emphasis in the original)).
416. Id. at 4 (citing JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT (1987)).
417. Id. at 48.
418. In this context, Kalman does not cite Archibald Cox's paean to the Warren Court,
with its telling subtitle. See ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM (1967).
419. KALMAN, supra note 23, at 49.
420. Id. (citing RICHARD POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 82 (1995)).
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efficaciousness of law42' evidenced by either the Warren Court or the
law professor.
Kalman depicts the law school in the atmosphere of the 1960s as
far less troubled than other divisions of the university. In fact, she
describes the law schools as rather untroubled: "The law schools
remained apart from the revolution-in large part because their
inhabitants perceived law to be in the vanguard of the revolution.'
4 2
Indeed, the liberal faith thrived in the law schools. If "[liberalism
fared better in law than it did in other fields," in the other fields "the
compromise of liberalism, the breakdown of 'law and order,' and the
war in Vietnam tarnished the concept by the decade's end and led to
disciplinary change."423 Liberalism and its tenets were under siege
outside the law schools.
It turns out that we did not wait long for the liberal faith in the law
schools to come under challenge. As Kalman argues, the "arrival of
law and economics and critical legal studies shattered the liberal
consensus."4 24 Nevertheless, what Kalman describes as a "shattering"
is really more a temporary decline, for perhaps the centerpiece of
Kalman's story is the reemergence of legal liberalism in the "turn to
history."' In an important sense, Kalman's book is building to a
point of narrative stasis, where Kalman can talk about the
disciplinary differences between law and history.
In her discussion of the "turn to history," particularly the adoption,
via the Johns Hopkins historian J.G.A. Pocock and others, of the
"republicanism" of the Founding, Kalman describes the difference
between how historians and lawyers write history. Basically, lawyers
delve into history because they are after a good legal argument. They
need additional support for their brief. And, as we know, their brief
is for legal liberalism. Perhaps in turning to republicanism, the
academic lawyer chose the wrong vehicle: "Had they but realized it,
421. In the context of his discussion of Ronald Coase and Charles Reich, Gary Minda
asserts that "[b]oth authors implicitly rejected traditional faith in the efficaciousness of the
legal process and the autonomy of fundamental rights." GARY MINIA, POSTMODERN LEGAL
MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 73 (1995). Minda's statement
might suggest a rejection by them of specific legal movements, since a few pages later in his
book he refers to the "growing disenchantment with the legal process and fundamental rights
schools." Id. at 83. But I think his statement about Coase and Reich's rejection is clearly
broader in its reference than a rejection of the two movements. I was particularly gratified to
come across Minda's reference to the "efficaciousness of legal process" because I had been
thinking in terms of the legal scholar's belief in the "efficaciousness of law" when I came across
it (even if here it is a rejection) and found it to be a strong support for my argument. Minda,
however, seems to indicate a narrower range of scholars who finally believe in the
efficaciousness of law than I do, although the range he suggests is quite large. See id.
422. KALMAN, supra note 23, at 53.
423. Id. at 54-55.
424. Id. at 94.
425. Thus Kalman's fifth chapter, "The Turn to History," see KALMAN, supra note 23, at
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the neorepublicans might have seen that other new theories offered
a more historically sensitive way of recapturing legal liberalism. ' 26
But what is most relevant in our context is not the turn to history,
nor legal scholars' identification with early modem republicanism,
but the survival of legal liberalism.
Kalman's book ends in an epilogue for the "strange career of legal
liberalism." This is another story of the demise of legal liberalism,
perhaps final this time, resulting from the emergence of
postmodernism in the legal academy. In this instance, legal
academics, often trained in other disciplines, are more truly
interdisciplinary than in past interdisciplinary attempts, so that
Kalman can describe the narrowing of the "gap between law school
and the university."4" This does seem like the end of legal
liberalism's "career." And yet, enough of the peculiarities of legal
thinking remain that Kalman can quote John Schlegel to the effect
that "[u]ntil one takes the 'and' out of 'law and...' there is no point
in talking."4 Here she can also quote Pierre Schlag to the effect that
"when traditional legal thought goes traveling (in the footnotes)
through the university, it never seems to encounter much of anything
except itself. The interdisciplinary travels of traditional legal thought
are like a bad European vacation: the substance is Europe, but the
form is McDonald's, Holiday Inns, American Express."429
I would like to expand on this little subplot in Kalman's epilogue,
on her quotations from Schlegel and Schlag. Kalman's pendulum
narrative of the legal academic's faith-that is, the faith in the courts
as an engine of reform-is interesting in part because of the
resilience of that faith. If one broadens the definition of legal
liberalism to encompass the range of views of the postwar legal
writers I have discussed in this Article and, consequently, to include
a commitment to a broader array of legal institutions than the courts
and a commitment to at least their reformability, some of the
pendulum movements of Kalman's narrative are muted. In fact, the
legal process school, with its considerations of "institutional
competency" -think of the five parts of Willard Hurst's The Growth
of American Law devoted to the legislature, the courts, the
constitution makers, the bar, and the executive 4 -would then fit
426. Id. at 177.
427. Id. at 245.
428. Id. at 244 (citing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 257 (1995)).
429. Id. at 244-45 (quoting Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of
Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOzO L. REv. 1631, 1656 (1990)). In
his survey of recent developments in legal thought, Gary Minda similarly quotes the same
trenchant passage from Pierre Schlag. See MINDA, supra note 421, at 79.
430. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
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more tightly into Kalman's story of legal liberalism. And this
commitment to legal institutions or at least to their potential for
reform, which I have located at the core of legal thought, may help to
explain why postwar legal writers were so much less encumbered by
the fear of totalitarianism than their counterparts elsewhere in the
university.
This faith-whether or not one wants to call it "legal liberalism" -
has been and remains at the core of legal writing and thinking. All of
the various "law and" movements may be much closer to the core
beliefs of the legal academy than their proponents have suggested. In
his Postmodern Legal Movements, Gary Minda contends that
"Arthur Leff was mistaken about the new 'law and' movements, as
they were not really radical departures from traditional modes of
legal thought at all. '43' They "simply shifted the frame of analysis
away from 'applying the law to the facts' (the traditional frame) to
applying the theory to the law'. '432 But, for Minda, the move from
the "law and" movements to a full-bore postmodernism does
represent a real change: "It is only now becoming clear that the new
legal discourses of the 'law and' movements of the late 1970s and
1980s have themselves become transformed by a general
disenchanted condition that has affected contemporary legal
scholarship -postmodernism. '""' Indeed, he ends his chapter on
postmodern jurisprudence by asserting: "For postmoderns, law
cannot be an autonomous, self-governing activity because there are
no fixed foundations on which one can ground legal justification
once and for all. ' 4 ' That, of course, is a bit final for postmodernism,
and I would argue that even in postmodern jurisprudence one can
discern the elements of more traditional legal thinking. In the end,
the disciplinary imprint is quite strong. Just as the progressive
corporate law scholars who contributed to Lawrence Mitchell's
Progressive Corporate Law had difficulty going beyond the facile
economic psychologizing of the traditional law and economics
style,35 legal academic writers in revolt maintain the imprint of their
discipline much more than they tend to admit.
The tendency of Kalman and others to focus on a court-centered
definition of legal liberalism reflects the unmistakable privileging of
(1950).
431. MINDA, supra note 421, at 79.
432. Id.
433. Id. (emphasis in the original).
434. Id. at 246.
435. See my discussion of the essays in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (1995) in Carl
Landauer, Beyond the Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of
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the court opinion in legal writing. The impact of a legal education
that focuses on casebooks is clearly still with us a century after it was
introduced by Langdell. Even courses that should focus on
regulation, such as securities law and tax law, are taught primarily
out of casebooks that emphasize court opinions. '36
The preoccupation with the courts can turn celebratory. The praise
of the Warren Court in Morton Horwitz's The Warren Court and the
Pursuit of Justice37 is noticeably more effusive than that of Archibald
Cox's book on the Warren Court from thirty years earlier, The
Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform.
While Cox still felt he needed to address the complaints of the
neutral principle crowd,438 Morton Horwitz has no such concern:
For the first time, democracy became the foundational value in
American Constitutional discourse, encouraging the Warren
Court to redefine the relationship between judicial review and
democracy. In the end, the Court managed to transcend the
traditionally dichotomous treatment of judicial review and
democracy as well as of liberty and equality. 39
Horwitz's fulsome praise of the Warren Court, especially the role
played by Brennan," ° is, of course, an implicit critique of the present
Court, but it is unmistakably an expression of faith in the power of
the Court as an institution to do good. For Horwitz, the Warren
Court provides the model for the "pursuit of justice."
More interesting in this context than Horwitz's slim Warren Court
book is Duncan Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication, for it
provides a self-conscious expression of just how embedded in many
traditional values of the legal culture critical legal studies has been
all along. Kennedy clearly retains a critical identity-the "critique"
of the title. After defining "modernism/postmodernism" (which he
will abbreviate as "mpm" through his book) as "a project with the
goal of achieving transcendent aesthetic/emotional/intellectual
436. A century after the invention of the case method, the casebook is so dominant in legal
education that the professor of my law school corporate finance class insisted on calling the
course's textbook, Brealey and Myers's Principles of Corporate Finance, a "casebook" despite
the fact that Brealey and Myers had little interest in the securities law docket of the Second
Circuit. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE (3d ed. 1988).
437. See MORTON J. HORWITz, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE
(1998).
438. "[Tlhere will be few who, if they could relive recent history, would choose to
exchange closer attention to conventional legal doctrines for the great strides taken under the
leadership of the Warren Court in civil rights, the strengthening of democratic self-
government, and the administration of criminal justice." Cox, supra note 418, at 23.
439. HORWITZ, supra note 437, at xii.
440. "Brennan, who was to become the most important intellectual influence on the
Warren Court, would also rank as one of the greatest justices in the nation's history." Id. at 8.
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experiences at the margins of or in the interstices of a disrupted
rational grid,""1 he tells us: "I have pursued my own version of a
left/mpm project in the context of American critical legal
studies .... "4" He begins a short subsection entitled "Subversion" by
stating: "This book is part of the long-running project of the critique
of judges, and for that reason has subversive aspirations."" 3 But at
the end of that short subsection, we find someone who is not so
radically subversive:
So here are my thoughts, first about the rule of law, and second
about, Reason, or at least about "objectivity." In each case, I
want to say that, yes, I am a "believer," but that, in my versions,
the ideals in question have only a little of the radiant authority
that Liberal theorists have hoped for them.4"
We may not have Learned Hand's judge "cloaking himself in the
majesty of an overshadowing past,""5 but we are closer than we may
have thought.
Indeed, Kennedy repeatedly makes clear that his critique is and
has been an internal critique of adjudication, so that he can matter-
of-factly state: "Like other crits who have worked on the internal
critique of legal reasoning, I've argued all along. .. "' But I want to
emphasize that Kennedy's book is not only an "internal critique"; it
is a critique of adjudication. On the first page of his introduction,
Kennedy tells us that the "main question addressed is the role of
political ideology.., in the part of judicial activity that is best
described as law making."" 7 And he goes on to explain that "judicial
law making has been the vehicle of ideological projects of this
familiar kind and of other kinds, but that ideologically oriented legal
work is different from ideologically oriented legislative work."'
Kennedy then explains how ideology enters legal decision making:
The law-making activity of judges takes place in the context of a
structure of legal rules, in the face of a particular gap, conflict or
ambiguity in the structure. Judges resolve interpretive questions
through a form of work that consists in restating some part of
this structure and then deploying a repertoire of legal arguments
441. See KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 7.
442. Id. at 8.
443. Id. at 12.
444. Id. at 12-13 (emphasis in original).
445. Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1939), reprinted in
HAND, supra note 5, at 129, 130.
446. KENNEDY, supra note 31, at 60. Kennedy, in fact, traces the lineage of his "internal
critique" to the more radical among the legal realists and can speak of "the emergence of an
internal critique of adjudication." Id at 88.
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to justify their solutions. The most important mode of influence
of ideology in adjudication comes from the interpenetration of
this specific technical rhetoric of legal justification and the
general political rhetoric of the time."9
In Kennedy's book, then, there is a certain givenness to his
adjudicatory environment. Kennedy does not reject deductive logic.
He argues that
it is common to believe that deduction is "formalism," an
invalid, discredited method of decision, and that nowadays we
reject it in favor of policy. This seems wrong to me. The judges
and treatise writers Fuller and Perdue criticized made a wrong
deduction. But this doesn't mean we don't still use their
method.45
Duncan Kennedy is Duncan Kennedy after all, and he would not
want his critique to be too domesticated, so he talks about a "viral
strain" of criticism of American law. That way he can suggest it is
internal to the "host" of the adjudication and is still dangerous and
threatening. Kennedy describes the "birth" of the virus:
At the turn of the century, the United States experienced a long
period of conservative judicial and liberal legislative control, one
that looked as though it might go on forever. Most liberals
simply continued arguing that each specific conservative judicial
decision was judicial legislation because there was a right legal
answer that the court disregarded in favor of its own subjective
ideological preference. But some liberals "couldn't take it
anymore" and began to argue that the problem was that there
were no correct legal answers to these questions. This was the
moment of the American mutation, the "birth of the virus.""45
Having described the beginnings of the "viral strain," Kennedy
offers that "[t]his book is an attempt to develop and extend this
American form of internal critique. To my mind, it is mainly through
this project, rather than through philosophy or political theory, that
American intellectuals have been participants in the larger,
worldwide long-running project of left/mpm critique."452
Kennedy's focus on "American intellectuals" here is quite
important. Not only does he locate the source of his interest in
appellate court opinions as deriving from his profession,453 but the
law professor also assumes a significant role in his story. He will talk
449. Id.
450. Id. at 104.
451. Id. at 81.
452. Id. at 82.
453. "My choice to focus on appellate decisions reflects, of course, my own specialization
as a teacher of legal doctrine to law students in a law school." Id. at 66.
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a great deal about "intellectuals" and "intelligentsias." Part of his
answer to when "we call a conflict over the definition of a rule of
law... 'ideological"' is when there is a "recognizable 'body of
thought,' a discourse, a sequence of texts, that can be 'applied' or
brought to bear over and over again to produce arguments in favor
of rule definitions that will favor the [implicated] interest. This
means an intelligentsia.""' If Kennedy is self-conscious about the
critique of mpm as "an elite project,""45 there is the little question
that the protagonist of the critique of adjudication is the law
professor and, significantly, the real work is done in the legal
academy rather than on the bench.
I have introduced Kennedy's A Critique of Adjudication because it
helps to point to the fact that the American legal academy-even in
some of its most critical moments-has strong ties to the institutions
of government. In Kennedy's book, law professors clearly have
something to do with the development of policy. Similarly, Dan
Danielsen and Karen Engle called the last section of their
introduction to After Identity, "A Post-identity Policy Proposal. 456
Professors of law are engaged in the forging of policy. Another way
to look at this conjunction of professors and policy is to understand
that, ultimately for legal academics, the law schools and their law
reviews are political institutions. But this is not new. Not only have
law professors had a positive relationship to the political institutions
of the country-or in their most critical moments at least to their
reformability-by comparison to their peers in the university, but
they have also seen the law school as having a part to play in
American policy formation. Like the courts, they have viewed the
law school as at once cloistered and politically connected. In a sense,
I am taking Pierre Schlag's suggestion that not only is legal thought
dominated by normativity but it also "assumes that its own
categories and grammar resonate deeply and authentically within the
culture in such a way that normative legal thought can be effective in
transforming and regulating the culture, '457 and I am extending it
beyond the court-dominated fora of Schlag's essay. Thus, if postwar
legal writers were less troubled by fears of totalitarianism than their
peers in the social and political sciences, it was in part because the
law school was imbued with a commitment to the institutions of
American government and to its own political role within them. In
454. Id. at 41.
455. Id. at 353.
456. See DAN DANIELSEN & KAREN ENGLE, Introduction to AFrER IDENTITY: A
READER IN LAW AND CULTURE, at xiii, xvii (1995).
457. Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, in PAUL E. CAMPOS ET AL.,
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an important sense, that commitment may still be with us.
In Patterns of American Jurisprudence, Neil Duxbury has provided
us a great service by writing an extended analysis that challenges
what he describes as the "basic pendulum-swing vision of American
jurisprudential history." '458 Duxbury, in taking up the story from the
so-called formalism of Langdell and others, is able to trace each
pendulum swing of revolt back through earlier precedents. In the
end, the pendulum swings do not look very dramatic, and there is a
realism to formalism and a formalism to realism. I would like to take
Duxbury's undermining of the "episodic conception" '459 of American
jurisprudence perhaps one step further and attempt to identify not so
much "patterns of American jurisprudence" as a pattern of
American jurisprudence. My own view, suggested by the legal
community's relative immunity to totalitarian anxieties, is that there
are core values in American legal thinking about its function and
about its relationship to governance, and these have had a long
vitality. When Robert Post, at the end of his reference to Joseph
Biden's comments about Lani Guinier during the controversy about
her nomination to head the Justice Department's Civil Rights
Division, writes: "Ensconced in the narrow world of law reviews, we
are apt to forget Arendt's harsh warning of the tension between
truth and politics. We are apt to confuse our truth with power,"4" he
hits upon the core of my analysis. Similarly, in an extended
introduction to his call for a cultural study of law, Paul Kahn
describes the instrumental reformist identity of legal scholarship in
America. "Our legal theorists," he contends, "celebrate the identity
of theory and practice." '461 Indeed, Kahn observes the difference
between political scientists and legal academics: "Political scientists
can study government without confusing their activity with the object
of their study." 2 In what might look like a strange
worldly/otherworldly binary, American legal thought has been
assured of its special place. That place is symbolized outwardly by
courtly accouterments, whether the black robe or The Bluebook, but
more substantially by its idioms of style and thought that remain
lodged in every revolt. And those idioms tend to live on in a
confidence in the policy relevance of legal thinking. Even when cast
as outsider dynamics, the insider confidence is still quite detectable.
458. DUXBURY, supra note 382, at 2.
459. Id. at 308.
460. Post, supra note 34, at 195.
461. PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 19 (1999); see also id. at 7-30.
462. Id. at 27.
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